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Does the Evolving Concept of Due
Process in Obergefell Justify Judicial
Regulation of Greenhouse Gases
and Climate Change?: Juliana v.
United States
Bradford C. Mank*
Justice Kennedy's Obergefell opinion, which held that same sex
marriage is a fundamental right under the Constitution's due process
clause, reasoned that the principles of substantive due process may evolve
because of changing societal views of what constitutes "liberty" under the
clause, and that judges may recognize new liberty rights in light of their
"reasonedjudgment." In Juliana v. United States, Judge Aiken used her
"reasonedjudgment" to conclude that evolving principles of substantive
due process in the Obergefell decision allowed the court to find that the
plaintiffs were entitled to a liberty right to a stable climate system capable
of sustaining human life, and, furthermore, that these same evolving
principles of substantive due process led the court to interpret the public
trust doctrine to now include a similar right to a sustainable climate
system. Relying on ChiefJustice Robert's dissenting opinion in Obergefell
and a decision by Judge Sutton of the Sixth Circuit, one may criticize the
Juliana decision for giving judges too much discretion to invent new due
process rights and usurp the role of the legislature. More appropriately,
Judge William Alsup of the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of
* Copyright @ 2018 Bradford C. Mank. James Helmer, Jr. Professor of Law and
Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Cincinnati College of Law, P.O.
Box 210040, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio 45221-0040, Telephone 513556-0094, Fax 513-556-1236, e-mail: brad.mank@uc.edu. I thank my faculty
colleagues for their comments at a summer 2017 workshop. I especially thank Michael
Solimine for his comments. In March 2018, 1 presented the paper at the Shapiro
Symposium on Public Trust Law, at the George Washington Law School. I appreciate
the debate and questions at the Symposium. All errors or omissions are my
responsibility.
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California dismissed a public nuisance suit against major oil companies
because Congress and the Executive Branch should decide climate change
policy rather than federal courts. ProfessorKenji Yoshino has argued that
the Obergefell decision should be interpreted as "antisubordination
liberty" that protects "historically subordinated groups." Following the
"antisubordinationliberty" principle, alleged victims of climate change
are arguably not entitled to special protection from the judiciary because
the impacts of such harms affect every person in the United States rather
than singling out under-represented minority groups, even if certain
"historically subordinated groups" are affected to a greater degree by
climate change. Instead of judicial intervention against President Trump's
climate policies, states and cities should exercise their right in our
federalist system to adopt policies reducing the impacts of climate change.
Furthermore, renewable energy appears to be on an unstoppable
trajectory to replace fossil fuels, so there is no need for judges to usurp
political policy decisions aboutfuture energy choices.
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INTRODUCTION

In Juliana v. United States,' a group of young people filed suit
arguing that the United States, then President Barack Obama, and
2
various federal agencies failed to regulate carbon dioxide ("CO ")

produced by burning fossil fuels, and that the resulting increased
levels of CO2

disrupted the Earth's climate system in a manner

2
threatening the plaintiffs with serious risks. The plaintiffs argued that
the defendants' actions contributing to rising greenhouse gases
("GHGs") violated their substantive due process rights to life, liberty,
and property.3 The plaintiffs also argued that the defendants had also
violated the federal government's common law duty to hold certain
resources in a "public trust" for present and future generations of
Americans. 4 In 2016, U.S. District Court Judge Ann Aiken of the U.S.
District of Oregon denied defendants' motions to dismiss by
concluding that the right to a stable climate system capable of
supporting human life is a fundamental substantive due process right,
5
and, additionally, is a right under the public trust doctrine.
In concluding that the plaintiffs had a substantive due process right
to a stable climate system, Judge Aiken relied upon the Supreme
6
Court's 2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, which held that same
sex marriage is a fundamental right under the Constitution's due
process clause. 7 Justice Anthony Kennedy's Obergefell opinion
reasoned that the principles of substantive due process may evolve
because of changing societal views of what constitutes "liberty" under
the clause, and, therefore, that judges may recognize new liberty rights
8
in light of their "reasoned judgment." In Juliana, Judge Aiken used
her "reasoned judgment" to conclude that evolving principles of
substantive due process in the Obergefell decision allowed the court to

1 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016).
2 Id. at 1233.
3 Id.
4

Id.

5 Id. at 1234, 1250-52, 1260-63.
6

135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
F. Supp. 3d at 1249-50 (discussing Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598-

7 Juliana, 217

99). The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution bars the federal government from depriving a person of "life, liberty, or
property" without "due process of law." Id. at 1248; see also U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
The same due process principles apply to state governments under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-49 (1968).
8 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598.
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find that the plaintiffs were entitled to a liberty right to a stable climate
system capable of sustaining human life. Furthermore, these same
evolving principles of substantive due process led the court to
interpret the public trust doctrine to now include a similar right to a
sustainable climate system.9
The Obergefell decision's concept of evolving due process rights
raises a number of concerns and objections. In his dissenting opinion
in Obergefell, Chief Justice John Roberts criticized Justice Kennedy's
majority opinion for giving judges too much discretion in deciding
which unenumerated due process rights are fundamental, thereby
giving judges unprecedented authority to strike down legislation that
they disfavor. 10 To avoid judicial usurpation of legislative power, Chief
Justice Roberts urged a return to an analysis of history and tradition in
determining which due process rights are fundamental, as the Court
had in Washington v. Glucksberg.11 Similarly, Judge Jeffrey Sutton of
the Sixth Circuit reasoned in DeBoer v. Snyder that using a substantive
due process analysis to strike down state laws prohibiting same sex
marriage would have profoundly anti-democratic impacts because that
type of reasoning could be used by judges to strike down other types
of legislation.1 2 Relying on Chief Justice Robert's critique of
substantive due process analysis in Obergefell and Judge Sutton's
similar arguments, one may criticize the Julianadecision for inventing
new due process rights and usurping the role of the legislature.13

9 Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1250-52, 1260-63.
10 See generally Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611-12, 2616-23 (Roberts, CJ.,
dissenting); see also Adam Lamparello, Justice Kennedy's Decision in Obergefell: A Sad
Day for the Judiciary, 6 Hous. L. REv. OFF REC. 45, 47-52 (2015) (criticizing Justice
Kennedy's overly expansive due process analysis for usurping legislative authority and
transferring it to judges).
11 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2615-18 (discussing the identification of
fundamental rights through history and tradition in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 720 (1997) and similar cases).
12 See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 416-18 (6th Cir. 2014), overruled
by
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
13 See Howard Slugh, Obergefell's Toxic judicialLegacy, NAT'L REv. (Apr. 10, 2017,
8:00 AM), (criticizing Juliana for using Obergefell's flawed evolving due process
rationale to invent a new constitutional due process right to a stable climate).
However, Judge Aiken tried to place some limitations on when pollution issues trigger
due process rights. She stated:
In framing the fundamental right at issue as the right to a climate system
capable of sustaining human life, I intend to strike a balance and to provide
some protection against the constitutionalization of all environmental
claims .

. .

. [A] cknowledgment of this fundamental right does not transform
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Another argument is that the Obergefell Court could have followed
lower federal court decisions using a narrower equal protection
analysis to achieve the result of judicial recognition of same sex
marriage without transforming the meaning of the Due Process
Clause. For example, Judge Richard Posner, in his Seventh Circuit
decision Baskin v. Bogan,1 4 struck down the prohibitions of two states
against same sex marriage under the Equal Protection Clause without
addressing the issue of whether such marriages are a fundamental
right under the Due Process Clause, and his narrower equal protection
approach to addressing the question of marital rights could serve as a
model to addressing other fundamental rights issues, including climate
change.' 5 Judge Posner's narrower approach to fundamental rights
issues using a rational basis analysis under the Equal Protection
Clause would have precluded Judge Aiken in Julianafrom establishing
a new constitutional right to a stable climate system because she
acknowledged that current environmental and energy laws addressing
climate change are rational and only fail if they are examined pursuant
to strict scrutiny review under Justice Kennedy's evolving due process
approach in Obergefell.16
More appropriately, in 2018, in City of Oakland vs. BP P.L.C., Judge
William Alsup of the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of
California, granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim regarding a public nuisance suit by the City of Oakland
against the largest oil companies with operations in the United
States." He concluded that Congress and the Executive Branch should
any minor or even moderate act that contributes to the warming of the
planet into a constitutional violation.

/

Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1250.
14 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014).
15 See id. at 654-57, 671-72; Lamparello, supra note 10, at 59-60; see also
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2623 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion failed to use the modern Equal Protection Clause's
"means-end methodology" in favor of a vague argument that there is "synergy"
between that Clause and the Due Process Clause).
16 Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1249-50 (discussing Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598).
17 Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaints at 15-16, City of
Oakland vs. BP P.L.C., No. C17-06011 WHA, 2018 WL 3609055 (N.D. Cal. July 27,
2018). On July 19, 2018, Judge John Kennan of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York dismissed a similar lawsuit brought by the City of New
York against the major oil companies. See Opinion and Order Dismissing Amended
Complaint at 3-8, 23, City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 475-76
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 18 Civ. 182 (JFK)); John Schwartz, Judge Throws Out New 7York
9
Climate Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/20l8/0 /1
climate/climate-lawsuit-new-york.html.
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decide climate change policy rather than federal courts even though he
accepted the plaintiffs argument that the burning of fossil fuels has a
major impact on the Earth's climate.' 8 Judge Alsup also emphasized
that climate change affects other nations, and that policy decisions
affecting foreign relations should be decided by the political branches
rather than by the federal courts. 19
For those not convinced by arguments in favor of Glucksberg's more
limited historical and tradition based conception of fundamental due
process rights, Professor Kenji Yoshino has supported an evolving
conception of due process, but also argued that the Obergefell decision
should be interpreted as a vision of liberty that he calls
"antisubordination liberty" that protects "historically subordinated
groups." 20 Pursuant to Professor Yoshino's "antisubordination liberty"
principle, alleged victims of climate change are arguably not entitled to
special protection from the judiciary because the impacts of such
harms affect every person in the United States. 21 It might be possible
to try to argue that certain "historically subordinated groups" are
affected to a greater degree by climate change,2 2 but that is primarily
the result of poverty rather than a deliberate attempt by government
officials to deny a stable climate system to certain groups. 23 Because

certain "historically subordinated groups" are affected to a greater
degree by climate change than others because of their poverty rather
than deliberate government action in most cases, these groups are not
18
19

Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaints, supra note 17, at 14.
See id. Judge Keenan raised similar foreign policy and separation of powers

concerns in dismissing New York City's climate suit against the major oil companies
because of their global operations and sales. See Opinion and Order Dismissing
Amended Complaint, supra note 17, at 20-23.
20 Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 147, 174 (2015).
21 See id.
22 See, e.g., Samantha Cooney, How Climate Change
Specifically Harms Women,
TIME (May 31, 2017), http://motto.time.con4799747/climate-change-women-parisclimate-deal/ (contending climate change disproportionately affects women); Mathew
Rodriguez, 5 Ways Trump's Paris Climate Accord Decision Will Hurt People of Color the
Most, Mic DAILY (May 31, 2017), https://mic.com/articles/178503/paris-climateaccord-trumps-decision-will-hurt-people-of-color-the-most#.P1 1ywJW8y
(arguing
President Trump's withdrawal from Paris Climate Accord will "especially [harm]
people of color, who often unfairly bear the brunt of climate change's effects").
23 See Suzanne Goldenberg, Climate Change: The Poor Will Suffer Most,
GUARDIAN
(Mar. 30, 2014, 8:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/Environment/2014/mar/31/
climate-change-poor-suffer-most-un-report (discussing a UN Report on Climate
Change and reporting that poor people are most likely to suffer from effects of natural
disasters exacerbated by climate change, although victims of discrimination are
vulnerable as well).
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entitled to protection under the Equal Protection Clause unlike, for
example, LGBT individuals whose rights were violated by state
24
governments that selectively enforced antisodomy laws against them.
Some readers may be sympathetic to Judge Aiken's Juliana opinion
because of their fears about the impacts of climate change.
Additionally, some readers may strongly disagree with President
Trump's 2017 disavowal of the Paris Climate Accord and believe that
25
judicial intervention is necessary to prevent an "imminent" climate
26
catastrophe. But there is greater danger in allowing the judiciary to
usurp the political and legislative process when one remembers that
the Julianasuit was initially directed at President Obama, the President
27
Instead, critics of
who advocated for the Paris Climate Accord.
President Trump's withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord should

&

24 See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 416 (6th Cir. 2014) (observing that gay
individuals were subject to prejudice and unequal enforcement of antisodomy laws
compared to straight sexual partners), overruled on other grounds by Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
25 Imminent is a relative term. Some of the differences in how readers and judges
respond to the issue of judicial intervention in climate change issues may depend
upon their understanding of the word "imminent." For some scientists, human
activities that may affect the global climate may appear imminent if they are likely to
cause changes in the Earth's environment in twenty years. For the purposes of this
article, however, the question of what is "imminent" is intertwined with whether
judges must act now or may wait for the legislative and executive branches to take
action. For the author, Bradford Mank, a human activity that may cause harm to the
environment is not imminent for the purposes of judicial intervention if a current or
future legislative or executive branch might take action to address climate change
issues without the need for an immediate judicial decision.
26 See Glenn Kessler & Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Fact-checking President Trump's
Claims on the Paris Climate Change Deal, WASH. POST (June 1, 2017),
2
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/ 017/06/01/fact-checkingPresident
(criticizing
president-trumps-claims-on-the-paris-climate-change-deal/
Trump's factual claims about Paris Climate Accord); see, e.g., Michael Biesecker
Paul Wiseman, AP Fact Check: Trump's Shaky Claims on Climate Accord, AP NEWS
(June 1, 2017), https://apnews.com/d4836217fa7b4d3eadea33dd20ceff3c ("Announcing
that the U.S. will withdraw from the Paris climate accord, President Donald Trump
misplaced the blame for what ails the coal industry and laid a shaky factual foundation
for his decision.").
27 See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1234 n.3 (D. Or. 2016) ("In the
2015 State of the Union address, defendant President Barack Obama declared '[nlo
challenge . . . poses a greater threat to future generations than climate change."' (citing
President Barack Obama, Remarks in State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2015),
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-union-addressjanuary-20-2015)); Dave Boyer, Obama Says Paris Climate Agreement Almost Complete,
WASH. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/oct/3/obamasays-paris-climate-agreement-almost-complete/ (reporting that President Obama held a
White House event supporting the Paris Climate Change agreement).
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exercise their voting rights in the 2018 congressional elections and
2020 presidential election.
A more immediate alternative is relying on states and cities to
exercise their right in our federalist system to adopt policies reducing
CO 2 and GHGs to reduce the impacts of climate change. A number of
states, cities, and private companies have announced efforts for further
climate change reduction actions in the wake of President Trump's
Paris Climate Accord withdrawal.28 Furthermore, there is evidence
that renewable energy and more efficient electricity technologies are
on an unstoppable path of replacing carbon-intensive fossil fuels. 29 For
example, new U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") data
shows that in 2017, the U.S. electricity sector emitted twenty-five
percent less carbon dioxide than in 2005. This is three-fourths of the
way towards meeting the thirty-two percent reduction by 2030 from
the same baseline that the Obama Administration had sought through
the Clean Power Plan rule that the Trump Administration rescinded. 30
Meanwhile, Bloomberg New Energy Finance ("BNEF") estimated an
even larger twenty-eight percent reduction in power-sector carbon
emissions from 2005 levels by 2017.31 Even if the United States does
28 Gerald B. Silverman, States Bet on Green Economy as Trump Dumps Climate
Programs, BLOOMBERG NEws (June 19, 2019), https://www.bna.com/states-bet-greenn73014453584 ("States and cities are doubling down on the green economy despite
President Donald Trump's dismissal of the Paris climate accord as a bad deal for the U.S.");
Abby Smith, Coalitions Redouble Paris Support but Face Challenge to Achieve GHG Pledge,
INSIDEEPA.cOM (June 6, 2017), https://insideepa.com/daily-news/coalitions-redouble-parissupport-face-challenge-achieve-ghg-pledge (reporting twelve states led by the Governors of
California, New York, and Washington State have formed U.S. Climate Alliance to support
the
Paris
Climate
Accord
to
reduce
GHGs);
WE
ARE
STILL
IN,
http://wearestillin.com/signatories (last visited Nov. 3, 2018) (listing ten states including
California, New York, North Carolina, Virginia, and Washington State as supporting the
Paris Accord).
29 See, e.g., Jess Shankleman & Hayley Warren, Solar Power Will Kill
Coal Sooner
Than
You
Think,
BLOOMBERG
(June
15,
2017,
10:08
AM
PDT)
https://www.bloomberg.connews/articles/2017-06-15/solar-power-will-kill-coal-soonerthan-you-think; Joseph P. Tomain, A U.S. Clean Energy Transition and the Trump
Administration
1, 4-5, 14-31
(May 22, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2983231
(arguing private sector
investments and state regulators are creating a clean energy transition that cannot be
stopped by Trump Administration's withdrawal from Paris or promotion of fossil fuels).
30 Lee Logan, Ongoing Power Sector GHG Cuts Could FrustratePruitt's CPP
Agenda,
INSIDEEPA.CoM (Feb. 8, 2018), https://insideepa.com/daily-news/ongoing-powersector-ghg-cuts-could-frustrate-pruitts-cpp-agenda.
31 According to Bloomberg New Energy Finance ("BNEF"), "Ip]ower-sector
emissions now sit 28% below their 2005 peak, which puts the U.S. only 4 percentage
points away from achieving its former Clean Power Plan target of 32% below 2005
levels by 2030. The rapid emissions reduction in the power sector has also helped to
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not support climate change mitigation efforts, current legal efforts in
other nations to decrease carbon emissions could lead to significant
decreases in future demand for fossil fuels by 2035 that could result in
losses of between $1 trillion and $4 trillion in asset values for fossil
fuel companies even if there are no additional new climate policies
32
taxing or regulating carbon dioxide. If renewable energy and more
efficient electricity technologies are on a clear trajectory to replace
carbon-intensive fossil fuels, there is no good reason to give federal
judges the power under the Due Process Clause to usurp the authority
33
to make energy policies from the political branches.
1.

A.

JULIANA

Introduction to the Juliana Decision

In Juliana, the plaintiffs included a group of young persons between
the ages of eight and nineteen that the District Court referred to as the
"youth plaintiffs"; Earth Guardians, an association of young
environmental activists; and Dr. James Hansen, who claimed to act as
34
a guardian for future generations. The age demographics of the
plaintiffs were significant because the court observed that "the
majority of youth plaintiffs are minors who cannot vote and must
bring the U.S. halfway to its abandoned Paris Agreement target of slashing economywide emissions to 26% below 2005 levels by 2025." BLOOMBERG NEw ENERGY FIN.,
SUSTAINABLE ENERGY IN AMERICA: 2018 FACTBOOK EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 (2018),
http://www.bcse.org/wp-content/uploads/2018-Sustainable-Energy-in-AmericaFactbookExecutive-Summary.pdf.
32 jean-Francois Mercure et al., Macroeconomic Impact of Stranded Fossil Fuel
Assets, 8 NATURE: CLIMATE CHANGE 588, 588 (2018), http://www.nature.com/articles/

2
s41558-018-018 -1; see also Mathew Carr, Fossil Fuels Seen Headingfor $4 Trillion

Crash,

Cambridge

Says,

BLOOMBERG

ENV'T

(June

6,

2018,

7:44

AM),

https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/fossil-fuels-seen(discussing Nature: Climate Change
heading-for-4-trillion-crash-cambridge-says
study); Jeff Glorfeld, "Stranded" Fossil Fuel Assets May Prompt $4 Trillion Crisis,
CosMos (June 5, 2018), https://cosmosmagazine.com/climate/stranded-fossil-fuelassets-may-prompt-4-trillion-crisis (same).
33 See infra Part III and Conclusion.
34 Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1233 (D. Or. 2016). Judge Aiken
did not address the standing of future generations to sue because she found at least
one plaintiff had standing to sue, and therefore did not have to determine whether
other plaintiffs had standing. Id. at 1248 n.5, 1260 n.13. Additionally, she did not
"address whether youth or future generations are suspect classifications for equal
protection purposes." Id. at 1249 n.7. However, the Juliana decision was "mindful of
the intergenerational dimensions of the public trust doctrine in issuing this opinion."
Id. at 1260 n.13.
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depend on others to protect their political interests."3 5 The plaintiffs
sued the United States, then President Obama, and several federal
executive agencies on the grounds that the federal government had
known for more than fifty years that burning fossil fuels produces
significant amounts of CO2 that destabilize the Earth's climate system,

and, thereby, endangered the plaintiffs. 36 The plaintiffs argued that
defendants had encouraged the use of fossil fuels despite their
knowledge that the resulting high levels of CO 2 caused climate change
and other harmful impacts. 3 7

The plaintiffs contended that the defendants' actions regarding fossil
fuel burning violated the plaintiffs' substantive due process rights to
life, liberty, and property. 38 Furthermore, the plaintiffs asserted that
the defendants' action violated the federal government's duty to hold
certain natural resources in the public trust for the American public
and future generations of Americans; Part I.E will explore the
definition of and precedent related to the "public trust" doctrine.39
Finally, the plaintiffs assert that in order to avert an impending
environmental catastrophe, they should be entitled to declaratory
relief of their due process and public trust rights, and injunctive relief
ordering the defendants to develop a plan to reduce CO 2 emissions. 40
The defendants and certain intervenors 4 1 moved to dismiss the
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a
claim.42 U.S. District Court Magistrate Judge Thomas Coffin issued
Findings and Recommendation ("F & R") regarding the plaintiffs'
claims and recommended that the district court deny the defendants'
motions to dismiss.43 Judge Aiken adopted Judge Coffin's F & R, and
also denied the defendants' motions to dismiss.44
Judge Aiken acknowledged the ramifications of the plaintiffs'
theories by observing that "[tihis is no ordinary lawsuit."45
Furthermore, she stated:
35
36

Id. at 1241.
Id. at 1233.

37 Id.
38

Id.

&

39 Id.; see infra Part I.E.
40 Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1233.
41 Intervenors the National Association of Manufacturers, the American Fuel
Petrochemical Manufacturers, and the American Petroleum Institute moved to dismiss
on the same grounds as the defendants. Id.
42

Id.

43

4

Id.
Id. at 1234.

45

Id.

The Evolving Concept of Due Process in Obergefell
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This lawsuit challenges decisions defendants have made across
a vast set of topics - decisions like whether and to what
extent to regulate CO 2 emissions from power plants and
vehicles, whether to permit fossil fuel extraction and
development to take place on federal lands, how much to
charge for use of those lands, whether to give tax breaks to the
fossil fuel industry, whether to subsidize or directly fund that
industry, whether to fund the construction of fossil fuel
infrastructure such as natural gas pipelines at home and
abroad, whether to permit the export and import of fossil fuels
from and to the United States, and whether to authorize new
marine coal terminal projects. Plaintiffs assert defendants'
decisions on these topics have substantially caused the planet
to warm and the oceans to rise. They draw a direct causal line
between defendants' policy choices and floods, food shortages,
destruction of property, species extinction, and a host of other
harms. 46
Judge Aiken explained that the federal government defendants did not
dispute that climate change was a serious threat to the planet Earth
caused by human beings.47 Then President Obama in his 2015 State of
the Union address declared that "[nlo challenge ... poses a greater
48
The private
threat to future generations than climate change."
industry intervenors "declined to take a clear position" on whether
49
human-caused climate change posed a serious threat to the Earth.
Judge Aiken explained that her decision would focus on the following
questions: "[Wihether defendants are responsible for some of the
harm caused by climate change, whether plaintiffs may challenge
defendants' climate change policy in court, and whether this Court can
direct defendants to change their policy without running afoul of the
50
separation of powers doctrine."
Magistrate Judge Coffin recommended denying the defendants' and
intervenors' motions to dismiss because he concluded that the
plaintiffs' public trust and due process claims were viable.51 The
defendants and intervenors objected to his recommendations because
they argued that the plaintiffs' claims must be dismissed for lack of

46

Id.

7

Id. at 1234 n.3.
8 Id.

9 Id.
50

Id. at 1234.

51

Id. at 1235.
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jurisdiction because the case presented non-justiciable political
questions, the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue, and federal public trust
claims could not be asserted against the federal government. 52 They
additionally claimed that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim on
which relief can be granted.5 3
B.

Political Question Doctrine

The federal government defendants and the private industry
intervenors argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction because
the case presented non-justiciable political questions.5 4 The Supreme
Court first recognized in Chief Justice Marshall's landmark Marbury v.
Madison decision that some questions are better resolved by the
political branches, the Executive Branch and Congress, than by the
federal courts.5 5 In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court observed that the
political question doctrine is based on the separation of powers
doctrine, which gives the branches of government largely separate
functions with some overlap. 56 The Baker decision established six
criteria, each of which by itself might be sufficient to raise a political
question barrier to judicial resolution of a case.57 The three most
important criteria are as follows: first, a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; second, a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; and, third, the impossibility of deciding

52

Id.

53

Id.

5

Id.

Id. (discussing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)).
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962).
5
The Baker Court applied the political question doctrine using the following six
factors:
55
56

(1) textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; (2) a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; (3) the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; (4) the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; (5) an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or (6) the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id. at 217;Juliana,217 F. Supp. 3d at 1236 (quoting the six-part Baker test).
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without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion.5 8
Judge Aiken noted the importance of the political question doctrine
in preserving the crucial separation of powers in our constitutional
system. 59 However, she argued that the doctrine was inappropriate in
this case's circumstances because "a court cannot simply err on the
side of declining to exercise jurisdiction when it fears a political
question may exist; it must instead diligently map the precise limits of
jurisdiction." 60 She observed that climate change, energy policy and
environmental regulatory issues had been the subject of political
debate, but concluded that courts could address politically charged
issues as long as an issue was not "inextricable" with a Baker
criterion. 61
Judge Aiken found that the first Baker factor did not apply because
climate change was "not inherently, or even primarily, a foreign policy
decision." 62 Additionally, she determined that the second and third
Baker criteria did not apply because the plaintiffs' substantive due
process and the government's public trust obligations were in the
scope of the court's competence. 63 The court rejected the defendants'
and intervenors' arguments that the court would improperly inject
itself into the political process by setting a permissible emissions level,
choosing which agencies or industrial sectors would have to reduce
emissions, or which agencies would have to enforce specific
regulations. 64 Judge Aiken reasoned that the "Court could issue the
requested declaration without directing any individual agency to take
any particular action." 65 In the event that the plaintiffs won on the
merits, she acknowledged that the court "would no doubt be
58 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (plurality opinion) (explaining
that the Baker factors "are probably listed in descending order of both importance and
certainty"); Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1236 (same); Michael C. Blumm & Mary
Christina Wood, "No Ordinary Lawsuit": Climate Change, Due Process, and the Public

Trust Doctrine, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 32 (2017).
19 SeeJuliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1235-36.
60 Id.
61 Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
62 Id. at 1238; Blumm & Wood, supra note 58, at 32.
63 Juliana,217 F. Supp. 3d at 1238-40; Blumm & Wood, supra note 58, at 32-33.
64 Juliana,217 F. Supp. 3d at 1238-39.
65 Id. at 1239; Blumm & Wood, supra note 58, at 33. But see Kanuk ex rel. Kanuk
v. State, Dep't of Nat. Res., 335 P.3d 1088, 1097-1103 (Alaska 2014) (finding
prudential grounds barred relief because a declaration that the atmosphere is subject
to the public trust doctrine would not resolve which specific steps Alaska should take
to reduce GHG emissions).
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compelled to exercise great care to avoid separation-of-powers
problems in crafting a remedy. The separation of powers might, for
example, permit the Court to direct defendants to ameliorate plaintiffs'
injuries but limit its ability to specify precisely how to do so."66
Accordingly, Judge Aiken concluded that the court could decide the
plaintiffs' suit without violating any of the Baker criteria or "to step
outside the core role of the judiciary to decide this case." 67
A better approach to the question of applying the Baker criteria to
climate change issues than the Juliana case is found in a decision by
the Supreme Court of Alaska. In Kanuk ex rel. Kanuk v. State, Dept. of
Natural Resources, the Supreme Court of Alaska took a different
approach to the political question doctrine and the appropriateness of
judicial remedies by concluding that the executive and legislative
branches are better suited to making climate policy than the courts.68
The plaintiffs' claims in Kanuk were similar to the public trust portion
of the complaint in Juliana. In Kanuk, the plaintiffs were six children
who sued the State of Alaska, claiming that the State violated its duties
under the Alaskan Constitution and the public trust doctrine by failing
to take actions to protect the atmosphere. 69 They sought declaratory
judgment on the nature of the State's duty to protect the atmosphere
and specific reductions in carbon dioxide emissions in the state.7 0 An
Alaskan superior court judge dismissed the complaint, finding that the
claims were not justiciable.71 The plaintiffs appealed to the Alaskan
Supreme Court. 72
Applying Baker's six factor political question test, the Alaska
Supreme Court in Kanuk concluded that the plaintiffs' requests for a
declaratory judgment that the State was obliged to reduce CO 2
emissions by at least six percent per year from 2013 through 2050
violated Baker's third factor that the legislature or the executive
branch should make public policy decisions rather than the
judiciary.73 It observed that the U.S. Supreme Court in American
Electric Power v. Connecticut ("AEP") had dismissed federal common
law nuisance claims filed against major electric utilities emitting large
quantities of CO 2 because the EPA was better equipped to regulate
66
67
68
69

Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1241; Blumm & Wood, supra note 58, at 33.
Juliana,217 F. Supp. 3d at 1241.
Kanuk, 335 P.3d at 1097-1103.
Id. at 1091.

70

Id.

71
72

Id.

73

Id. at 1097-98.

Id.
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major emitters of GHGs under environmental statutes such as the
Clean Air Act rather than judges.74 In addition, the Kanuk Court
determined that the plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief under the
public trust doctrine of the Alaskan state constitution did not violate
the political question doctrine.7 5 The Court, however, on prudential
grounds barred relief because a declaration that the atmosphere is
subject to the public trust doctrine would not resolve which specific
76
steps Alaska should take to reduce GHG emissions.
While state court decisions are not binding upon federal courts, the
Ninth Circuit or the Supreme Court should learn from the reasoning
of the Kanuk decision, and bar suits like Juliana either under factor
three of the Baker decision or more general prudential grounds.
Courts should reject climate change suits seeking redress because such
suits would require courts to either issue detailed directives that
interfere with the legislative or executive branches, or, in the
alternative, to issue vague declarations that climate change is "bad"
that cannot meaningfully guide the actions of the government.
Additionally, while not formally invoking the political question
doctrine, Judge Alsup dismissed a public nuisance suit against major
oil companies because he determined that Congress and the Executive
Branch should decide climate change policy rather than federal courts,
especially because such policy decisions affect international relations
77
issues that should be decided by the political branches. Contrary to
Judge Aiken's approach to the political question doctrine, the better
approach is to let the legislative and executive branches decide climate
policy as suggested by Kanuk ex rel. Kanuk and Judge Alsup.
Justice Sotomayor in a concurring opinion has suggested that it is
inappropriate for judges to wade into controversial policy decisions,
which arguably include how to address climate change. In Zivotofsky
ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton,7 8 Justice Sotomayor in an opinion
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, which was joined
by Justice Breyer, observed that the traditional role of English and
American courts:

74 Id. at 1098-99 (citing Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 415-29
(2011)).
75 Id. at 1099-1103.
76

Id.

77 See Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaints at 14, City of
Oakland vs. BP P.L.C., No. C17-06011 WHA, 2018 WL 3609055, (N.D. Cal. July 27,
2018).
78 566 U.S. 189 (2012).
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[I]involves the application of some manageable and cognizable
standard within the competence of the Judiciary to ascertain
and employ to the facts of a concrete case. When a court is
given no standard by which to adjudicate a dispute, or cannot
resolve a dispute in the absence of a yet-unmade policy
determination charged to a political branch, resolution of the
suit is beyond the judicial role envisioned by Article III.79
Justice Sotomayor's opinion further explained,
This is not to say, of course, that courts are incapable of
interpreting or applying somewhat ambiguous standards using
familiar tools of statutory or constitutional interpretation. But
where an issue leaves courts truly rudderless, there can be "no
doubt of [the] validity" of a court's decision to abstain from
judgment.8 0
The difficult policy choices involving climate change and energy
policy are such an issue where there is no "manageable and cognizable
standard within the competence of the Judiciary." 8 1 Therefore, in light
of the analysis in Kanuk, Judge Alsup's opinion and Justice
Sotomayor's concurring opinion, federal courts should invoke either
the political question doctrine, prudential reasons, or, jurisdictional
reasons such as standing to avoid cases seeking a fundamental political
decision about how to achieve a stable climate system.
C.

Standing to Sue

Pursuant to Article III's "Case" and "Controversies" language in the
U.S. Constitution defining the jurisdiction of federal courts,8 2 at least

79

Id. at 203-04 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the

judgment) (citations omitted).
80 Id. at 204.
81 Id. at 203-04.
82 The constitutional

Section 2, which provides:

standing requirements are derived from Article III,

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or

which shall be made, under their Authority; - to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; - to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; - to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party; - to Controversies between two or more
States; - between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of
different States; - between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
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one plaintiff in every federal court suit must have "standing" to sue to
demonstrate that the plaintiff is pursuing an actual case or controversy
and is not simply seeking an advisory opinion about a hypothetical
case. 83 To demonstrate Article III standing, a plaintiff must show that
(1) she has suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized,
and actual or imminent; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
defendant's challenged conduct; and (3) the injury is likely to be
84
redressed by a favorable court decision. A plaintiff has the burden of
demonstrating each element of the standing test at each stage of the
litigation.85 The Juliana court observed that because the defendants
had filed a motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs were simply required to
86
make general allegations sufficient to prove standing. At the motion
to dismiss stage of litigation, a plaintiffs conclusory allegations are
presumed to be true because the plaintiffs have not yet had the chance
87
to present evidence.
The government argued that the plaintiffs' alleged injuries from
climate change were nonjusticiable generalized grievances because
88
climate change affects every person on the planet Earth. The Juliana
court, however, concluded that widely shared injuries can be sufficient
injuries as long as a plaintiff suffers a concrete injury as opposed to an
abstract injury. 89 The court concluded that at least some of the
individual plaintiffs had proven an injury from flooding and high
9
temperatures that appeared to be related to climate change. 0

Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2; see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 34042 (2006) (explaining why Supreme Court infers that Article III's case and
controversy requirement necessitates standing limitations).
83 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016); Juliana v. United States,
217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1242 (D. Or. 2016); Bradford C. Mank, No Article III Standing
for Private Plaintiffs Challenging State Greenhouse Gas Regulations: The Ninth Circuit's
Decision in Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 1525,
1532-33 (2014).
84 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61
(1992); Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1242; Mank, supra note 83, at 1534.
85 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561; Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at
1242; Mank, supra note 83, at 1534.
86 Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1242, 1245-46.
87 Id.; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
88 Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1243.
89 Id. at 1243-44.
90 See id. at 1242-44.
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Yet the Julianadecision failed to address whether non-state plaintiffs
are entitled to sue the federal government. The leading case involving
climate change is Massachusetts v. E.P.A.,91 which only recognized that
the state government of Massachusetts had Article III standing to sue
the federal government for its failure to regulate climate change
because states were "entitled to special solicitude in our standing
analysis." 92 Massachusetts did not directly address whether private
parties have similar standing rights to bring climate change suits
against the federal government. 93 However, the Court implied that
private parties might have lesser standing rights when it declared that
"[i]t is of considerable relevance that the party seeking review here is a
sovereign State and not, as it was in Lujan, a private individual."94 It is
not clear whether the Supreme Court would be as willing to recognize
private party standing against the federal government in climate suits
as in the Massachusetts decision, 95 and, accordingly, the Juliana
decision should have at least flagged the distinction between state
standing and private standing as a potential issue in its standing
analysis. Applying a rule that only states have standing to challenge
the federal government's alleged failure to address climate change
would have required a court to dismiss a case like Juliana. However,
California and other states have strongly supported the Paris Climate
Accord despite President's Trump's announcement indicating his
desire to withdraw from the Accord. 96 Accordingly, a precedent
limiting climate suits against the federal government to state plaintiffs
would not prevent state challenges to his Administration's climate
policies.
Addressing the second prong of the standing test, causation, the
Julianadecision concluded that the plaintiffs had established that their
injuries were fairly traceable to the government's actions. 97 The
91

549 U.S. 497 (2007).
92 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518-20; Mank, supra note 83, at 1528, 1536-38.
93 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518-20; Mank, supra note 83, at 1528.
94 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518-20; Mank, supra note 83, at 1528. In Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, several environmental groups brought an action against the
Secretary of Interior challenging the agency's interpretation of a regulation. See Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 557-59 (1992).
9" See Mank, supra note 83, at 1556-57, 1584-85.
96 Javier C. Hernandez & Adam Nagourney, As Trump Steps Back, Jerry Brown Talks
Climate Change in China, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
20 7
1 /0 6 /0 6 /world/asia/xi-jinping-china-jerry-brown-california-climate.html
(reporting
the State of California strongly supports the Paris Climate Accord despite President
Trump's announced withdrawal); Smith, supranote 28; WE ARE STILL IN, supra note 28.
97 Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1246 (D. Or. 2016).
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government defendants had argued that the plaintiffs had failed to
prove causation in light of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Washington
Environmental Council v. Bellon, 98 which dismissed a climate change
suit both because it determined that the five Washington State oil
refineries at issue had only a small impact on worldwide GHG
emissions and because it was too difficult to measure the impact of
those refineries on the local climate in one state. 99 The Juliana
decision, however, distinguished the standing causation facts and
outcome in its case from Bellon in "two important respects."10 0 First,
Judge Aiken observed that the procedural posture was different
because the appeal in Bellon was from a grant of summary judgment
relying on expert declarations, but the Juliana decision involved a
motion to dismiss before the plaintiff had a chance to present
evidence.' 0' She observed that "climate science is constantly evolving,"
therefore, she could not "interpret Bellon - which relied on a
summary judgment record developed more than five years ago - to
02 In a
forever close the courthouse doors to climate change claims."
2014 article, this author, Bradford Mank, predicted that future lower
courts could disregard the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Bellon that
science is not capable of measuring local climate change impacts based
upon the argument that new scientific methods enabled scientists to
make a causal link between local GHG sources and local climate
change impacts that was not possible at the time of Bellon's decision in
2014.103 Second, the Juliana decision determined that causation in its
case was different from the Bellon decision. Julianainvolved the impact
of all U.S. emissions affected by the federal government's actions, a
significant portion of both national and worldwide GHG emissions,
whereas only five refineries were at issue in Bellon, a tiny portion of
global CO 2 emissions.1 04 Accordingly, Judge Aiken in the Juliana
decision found that the plaintiffs had established standing
causation. 105

98

732 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2013).

99 Id. at 1143-44, 1146; Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1244-45 (discussing the Ninth

Circuit's standing analysis in Bellon); see Mank, supra note 83, at 1569-72.
100 Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1245.
101

Id.

Id. (citing Kirsten Engel & Jonathan Overpeck, Adaptation and the Courtroom:
Judging Climate Science, 3 MICH.J. ENV'T & ADMIN. L. 1, 25 (2013)).
103 Mank, supranote 83, at 1570-71 & n.295.
104 Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1245.
105 Id. at 1246.
102
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Finally, the Julianadecision concluded that the plaintiffs had proven
standing redressability.O6 Judge Aiken rejected the government's
argument that a favorable judgment by her court could not guarantee
an overall reduction in GHG emissions because "redressability does
not require certainty, it requires only a substantial likelihood that the
Court could provide meaningful relief." 10 She observed that the U.S.
Supreme Court's Massachusetts decision had only required plaintiffs to
demonstrate that a "requested remedy would 'slow or reduce' the
harm."108 Furthermore, the Juliana decision distinguished the
redressability analysis in its case from Bellon because the five refineries
in that case had far smaller impacts on global climate change. 109
Therefore, both the causation and redressability analysis in the Bellon
Ninth Circuit case was inapplicable to the Juliana case. 110 Additionally,
the Juliana decision reasoned that "the possibility that some other
individual or entity might later cause the same injury does not defeat
standing - the question is whether the injury caused by the defendant
can be redressed."" While acknowledging that the redressability issue
raised many scientific questions, Judge Aiken determined that the
plaintiffs did not have to answer those questions at the motion to
dismiss stage of the proceedings. 11 2 She concluded, "Construing the
complaint in plaintiffs' favor, they allege that this relief would at least
partially redress their asserted injuries. Youth plaintiffs have
adequately alleged they have standing to sue." 1 3
D. Due Process Claims
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution prohibits the federal government from depriving a person
of "life, liberty, or property" without "due process of law."11 4 The

plaintiffs in the Juliana case alleged that the federal government
defendants had violated their due process rights by approving and
promoting fossil fuel development.115 For example, they argued that

107

Id. at 1247-48.
Id. at 1247.

108

Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525 (2007)).

109

Id.

106

110 Id. at 1245-47.
111 Id. at 1247.
112
113

See id.
Id. at 1248.
amend. V.
Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1248.

114 U.S. CONST.

11
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the government's extraction and burning of such fuels resulted in
rising atmospheric CO 2 levels "that dangerously interfere with a stable
climate system" required for the health and safety of the plaintiffs and
the entire U.S. population. 116 The federal government defendants and
private party intervenors objected to the plaintiffs' due process claims
on two grounds.11 7 First, they contended that the plaintiffs' challenge
to the defendants' affirmative actions in leasing land or issuing permits
was inappropriate because the plaintiffs had failed to assert an
infringement of a fundamental due process right or improper
8
discrimination against a suspect class of persons.11 Second, they
argued that the plaintiffs could not challenge the defendants' alleged
inaction to prevent private third parties from emitting CO 2 at
dangerous levels because the defendants did not have an affirmative
duty to protect the plaintiffs from the impacts of climate change.119
The Juliana decision initially examined the plaintiffs' claim that the
government had violated their rights through affirmative acts in
permitting fossil fuel development.1 20 The court observed that the
default level of judicial scrutiny is whether there is a rational basis for
the government's actions.121 However, a court applies a much more
demanding strict scrutiny review if the government violates a
"fundamental right" of the plaintiff.1 22 Judge Aiken acknowledged that
it was clear and undisputed that the government's actions approving
various types of fossil fuel extraction and burning would pass rational
basis review.1 23 So the crucial issue in resolving the motion to dismiss
was whether the plaintiffs had asserted the violation of a fundamental
right.1 24
The Juliana decision explained that fundamental due process liberty
rights include both rights enumerated elsewhere in the U.S.
Constitution and rights and liberties which are either (1) "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" or (2) "fundamental to
our scheme of ordered liberty." 25 In Washington v. Glucksberg, the

116

Id.

117

Id.

1ia Id.
119

Id.

See id.
121 Id.
122 See id.
123 Id. at 1249.
124 Id.
125 Id. (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010)); accord
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).
120
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Supreme Court warned that federal courts must "exercise the utmost
care whenever .

.

. asked to break new ground in this field, lest the

liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into
[judicial] policy preferences."126 However, Judge Aiken observed that
the cautious approach to creating new due process rights in
Glucksberg was significantly changed in Justice Kennedy's Obergefell
decision, which recognized a new fundamental due process right to
same sex marriage.1 27 The Obergefell decision gave federal judges more
discretion to establish new fundamental due process rights than
Glucksberg's history and tradition test.1 28 Justice Kennedy stated that
courts must:
"[Eixercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the
person so fundamental that the State must accord them its
respect ....

History and tradition guide and discipline the

inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries .... When new
insight reveals discord between the Constitution's central
protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty
must be addressed.129
In his dissenting opinion in Obergefell, Chief Justice Roberts
attacked Justice Kennedy's majority opinion for "break[ing] sharply
with decades of precedent" in effectively overruling "the importance of
history and tradition" in how the Court had defined fundamental
rights inquiry in Glucksberg.130 He noted that "many other cases both
before and after have adopted the same approach."'31 Chief Justice
Roberts reasoned that Obergefell's "aggressive application of
substantive due process" would provide judges too much discretion in
deciding issues which properly belong to legislative decisions.132 As
the next few paragraphs will demonstrate, Judge Aiken could have
only found a substantive due process right under Obergefell's broad

Id. (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720) (internal quotations omitted)).
Id. (discussing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015)).
128 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589 (2015).
129 Id.
130 See id. at 2618-19 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting).
131 Id. at 2618.
132 See also Lamparello, supra note 10, at 47-52 (criticizing Justice Kennedy's
expansive due process analysis for usurping traditional legislative authority and
transferring it to judges); infra Part II. See generally Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611-12,
2616-23 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
126

127
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and evolving approach to due process and not under Glucksberg's
narrower history and tradition approach. 133
Relying on the "reasoned judgment" standard for fundamental due
process rights in Obergefell, Judge Aiken concluded that "I have no
doubt that the right to a climate system capable of sustaining human
34
life is fundamental to a free and ordered society."1 Analogizing to
Obergefell's view that "marriage is the 'foundation of the family,"' she
reasoned that "a stable climate system [was] quite literally the
foundation 'of society, without which there would be neither
civilization nor progress."'1 35 She cautioned that the due process right
to a stable climate system did not mean that plaintiffs could sue
regarding "the government's role in producing any pollution or in
causing any climate change." 3 6 Judge Aiken explained, "In framing
the fundamental right at issue as the right to a climate system capable
of sustaining human life, I intend to strike a balance and to provide
some protection against the constitutionalization of all environmental
claims."1 37 She held that a valid due process claim regarding climate
change required a plaintiff to assert that the "governmental action
[was] affirmatively and substantially damaging the climate system in a
way that will cause human deaths, shorten human lifespans, result in
widespread damage to property, threaten human food sources, and
dramatically alter the planet's ecosystem."1 38 Yet even such serious
allegations would not have violated due process under Glucksberg's
narrower history and tradition approach, and is only possible under
39 In
Obergefell's broader and evolving approach to due process.1
particular, courts have traditionally avoided making the judiciary the
direct or innovative policymaker of climate change policy until Judge
Aiken's decision.1 40
133 See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1249-50 (D. Or. 2016)
(implicitly acknowledging that plaintiffs' due process claims were viable under
Obergefell's new expansive reading of the Due Process Clause, but not under the prior
history and tradition standard of interpretation); see also infra Part II.
134 Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1250 (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598
(majority opinion)).

135

Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138

Id.

See infra Part II. See generallyJuliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1249-50.
140 See David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An EmpiricalAssessment of Climate Change in the
Courts: A New Jurisprudenceor Business as Usual?, 64 FLA. L. REv. 15, 22, 77-78, 85-86
(2012) (arguing that most court decisions have treated climate change cases as
business as usual rather than as opportunity to make new law).
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Judge Aiken in the Juliana decision next explained that the Due
Process Clause usually does not create an affirmative duty on the part
of the government to act.141 However, she explained that government
inaction can be subject to the Due Process Clause in two
circumstances: "(1) [TIhe 'special relationship' exception; and (2) the
'danger creation' exception."1 42 The special relationship exception
applies when the government takes an individual into custody against
his or her will such as through imprisonment, and was not relevant to
the plaintiffs.14 3 However, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had
successfully alleged sufficient facts at the motion to dismiss stage of
litigation that the government defendants had violated the "danger
creation" exception because the federal government had possibly acted
with deliberate indifference to the safety of the plaintiffs by failing to
take steps to address and ameliorate serious risks from climate
change.1 44
The Juliana decision rejected the governments' argument that the
"danger creation" exception should not be applied in the context of
climate change litigation.145 Judge Aiken noted that several "rigorous
proof requirements" limited such claims.14 6 She stated:
A plaintiff asserting a danger-creation due process claim must
show (1) the government's acts created the danger to the
plaintiff; (2) the government knew its acts caused that danger;
and (3) the government with deliberate indifference failed to act
to prevent the alleged harm. These stringent standards are
sufficient safeguards against the flood of litigation concerns
raised by defendants - indeed, they pose a significant
challenge for plaintiffs in this very lawsuit.1 47
Judge Aiken observed that she was bound to accept the plaintiffs'
factual allegations at the motion to dismiss stage, and that they would
have to prove their case at trial.1 48 She reasoned that the plaintiffs'
allegations, if true, were sufficient to state a substantive due process

141 Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1250-51.
142 Id. at 1251 (citation omitted).
14

Id.

Id. at 1251-52.
145 See id. at 1252.
144

Id.
147 Id. (footnote
148 Id.
146

omitted).
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challenge for the defendants' failure to adequately regulate CO 2 and
GHG emissions. 149 She summarized those allegations as follows:
Plaintiffs have alleged that defendants played a significant role
in creating the current climate crisis, that defendants acted
with full knowledge of the consequences of their actions, and
that defendants have failed to correct or mitigate the harms
they helped create in deliberate indifference to the injuries
caused by climate change.150
By denying the defendants' motions to dismiss, Judge Aiken allowed
the plaintiffs to go forward with their "substantive due process
challenge to defendants' [alleged] failure to adequately regulate CO 2
emissions." 151 As is discussed in Part II of this Article, the Juliana
plaintiffs' substantive due process challenge is viable in the light of
Obergefell's evolving due process standard, but would likely have failed
under Glucksberg's history and tradition standard. 152
E.

Public Trust Claims

In Part IV of her Juliana opinion, Judge Aiken addressed the
plaintiffs' claim that the federal government plaintiffs had violated
their duty under the public trust doctrine ("PTD") to protect air and
other natural resources from the government's failure to regulate
greenhouse gases that threaten "imminent" catastrophic climate
change.1 53 She characterized the PTD as an inherent limit on
sovereignty of government because the current government may not
destroy important natural resources that should be available to future
legislatures. 154 The Juliana decision observed that the PTD predated
the United States, with roots in Roman law and the English common
law. 155 The protection of submerged lands under tidal and navigable
waters is at the core of the PTD.1 56 However, Judge Aiken quoted a
149

See id.

150

Id.

151
152

Id.

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611-12, 2616-23 (Roberts, CJ.,
dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion for departing from Glucksberg's history
and tradition standard, and, thereby giving judges too much discretion to overrule
legislative decisions); see Lamparello, supra note 10, at 47-52 (same); infra Part II.
153 Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1252-61, 1267, 1272 (assuming that plaintiffs'
allegations of imminent harm are true at this stage of litigation).
154 See id. at 1252-53, 1260-61.
155 Id. at 1253, 1260-61.
156 See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S.
261, 284 (1997)

880

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 52:855

broader definition of the PTD in the sixth century Institutes of
Justinian, 157 which declared that "the following things are by natural
law common to all the air, running water, the sea, and
consequently the seashore."158
Judge Aiken noted that "the seminal [U.S.] Supreme Court case on
the public trust is Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois."159 The
Supreme Court held that the Illinois legislature had violated the PTD
when it conveyed title to "part of the submerged lands beneath the
harbor of Chicago, with the intent to give the company control over
the waters above the submerged lands against any future exercise of
power over them by the state." 160 Despite the Institutes of Justinian's
reference to air resources, the Illinois Central decision and other
Supreme Court decisions cited in Juliana demonstrate that the
protection of public access to navigation and submerged lands are at
the core of the PTD.1 61 Professor James Huffman has argued that the
vast majority of American public trust decisions have followed the
English common law in "narrowly apply[ing]" the PTD "to navigable
waters for the purposes of navigation, commerce, fishing and
sometimes bathing" rather than "the broad and sweeping language of
Justinian." 62 Thus, the government defendants and private
intervenors appropriately questioned whether the scope of the PTD
could be expanded beyond submerged lands to include the
("American law adopted as its own much of the English law respecting navigable
waters, including the principle that submerged lands are held for a public purpose.");
Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 473 (1988) ("At common law, the
title and dominion in lands flowed by the tide water were in the King for the benefit of
the nation. . . . Upon the American Revolution, these rights, charged with a like trust,
were vested in the original States within their respective borders . . . ." (quoting
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894))); Austin W. Probst, Note, Go With the Flow:
The Public Trust Doctrineand Standing, 62 WAYNE L. REV. 535, 537-40 (2017).
157 The Institutes of Justinian codified Roman law and "is the foundation
for
modern civil law systems" in many nations. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1253 (citing
Timothy G. Kearley, Justice Fred Blume and the TranslationofJustinian's Code, 99 IAw
LIBR.J. 525, 1 1 (2007)).
158 Id. (citing J. Inst. 2.1.1 (J.B. Moyle trans.));
see also Michael O'Loughlin,
Understanding the Public Trust Doctrine Through Due Process, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1321,
1331-32 (2017) (discussing the Public Trust Doctrine in Roman Law and Justinian
Institutes).
159 Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1254 (citing Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146
U.S.
387 (1892)).
160 See id. (quoting Ill. Cent. R.R Co., 146 U.S. at 452-54) (internal
quotation
marks omitted).
161

See sources cited supra note 160.

James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1, 96-97 (2007).
162

A History of the Public
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atmosphere.163 Judge Aiken ultimately did not decide whether the PTD
included air resources, but instead found that plaintiffs had properly
alleged violations of the PTD in connection with the territorial sea and
submerged tidal lands affected by ocean acidification and rising ocean
64
temperatures linked to climate change.1
The government defendants and private intervenors argued that the
"federal government, unlike the states, has no public trust
obligations."1 65 Alternatively, they contended that any common law
public trust claims applicable to the plaintiffs' alleged climate change
impacts have been displaced by federal environmental statutes such as
the Clean Air Act.1 66 Finally, they maintained that even if there is a
federal public trust, that the plaintiffs lacked a right to enforce it
because any enforcement actions by a federal court would conflict
67
with, and be displaced by, federal statutory law.1 Judge Aiken
168
disagreed with all three of these arguments.
Judge Aiken concluded that the argument of the defendants and
intervenors that the PTD applied only to states and not to the federal
government was wrongly based on dictum in PPL Montana, LLC v.
Montana, which was a case focusing on the "equal footing doctrine"
and not a PTD case.1 69 In PPL Montana, the Court stated that the
equal-footing doctrine, which gives new states title to tidal or
navigable riverbeds within its boundaries, is a federal constitutional
70
doctrine, but that "the [PTL] remains a matter of state law."1 In
Juliana, Judge Aiken reasoned that PPL Montana's phrase treating the
PTD as state law was mere dictum that did not prevent federal courts
from recognizing "the viability of federal public trust claims with
respect to federally-owned trust assets" because the PPL Montana
163 Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1254-55.
164 Id. at 1255-56; Blumm & Wood, supra note 58, at 45. In footnote 10, Judge
Aiken suggested that she thought that the PTD includes air resources, and observed
that the "dearth of litigation focusing on atmosphere may reflect the limited state of
scientific knowledge rather than signal a determination that the air is outside the
scope of the public trust." Id. at 1255 n.10 ("[H]ypothesizing that the atmosphere
does not appear in early public trust case law because air was long thought to be
indestructible and incapable of privatization." (citing Mary C. Wood, Atmospheric
Trust Litigation Across the World, in FIDUCIARY DUTY AND THE ATMOSPHERIC TRUST 113
(Ken Coghill et al. eds., 2012))).
165 Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1255-59.
166 Id. at 1255, 1259-60.

Id. at 1255, 1260-61.
Id. at 1256-61.
169 See id. at 1256-58 (discussing PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576
(2012)).
170 PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603 (2012).
167
168
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Court never addressed whether a federal PTD obligation exists. 171 She
acknowledged that the U.S. Supreme Court has partially treated the
crucial Illinois Central decision as an interpretation of Illinois law.172
However, she interpreted the Court's decision in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe of Idaho173 to treat the Illinois Central decision and PTD as a
more general "American [PTD], which has diverged from the English
public trust doctrine in important ways."1 74 If there is an "American
[PTD]," Judge Aiken reasoned that "[t]here is no reason why the
central tenets of Illinois Central should apply to another state, but not
to the federal government."1 75
Judge Aiken explicitly disagreed with the Alec L. decision1 76 by the
federal district court for the District of Columbia, which held that the
PTD did not apply to the federal government.1 77 The Alec L. case was
"substantially similar" to the Juliana action, with youth plaintiffs suing
a number of federal agency heads seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief for their failure to reduce GHGs and to meet their public trust
obligations to protect the Earth's atmosphere.1 78 The Alec L. decision
dismissed the suit with prejudice because it relied on PPL Montana's
treatment of the PTD as state law as binding even if that statement was

171 Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1257. But see Matthew Schneider,
Where Juliana
Went Wrong: Applying the Public Trust Doctrine to Climate Change Adaptation at the
State Level, 41 ENVIRONs ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 47, 58 (2017) (disagreeing with Judge
Aiken's reasoning that PPL Montana's phrase treating the PTD as state law was mere
dictum because "lower courts still generally treat it as precedent-setting").
172 Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1257.
173 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
174 Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 (discussing Coeur d'Alene Tribe,
521 U.S. at
285-86).

175

Id.

176 Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2012).
177 Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1258.
178 CompareId. at 1233-34 (describing "youth plaintiffs" and their argument that
the government defendants' actions promoting fossil fuels caused climate change
violating their due process rights and rights under the public trust doctrine), 1258
(stating "Alec L. was substantially similar to the instant action: five youth plaintiffs
and two environmental advocacy organizations sued a variety of heads of federal
agencies, alleging the defendants had 'wasted and failed to preserve and protect the
atmosphere Public Trust asset.' 863 F.Supp.2d at 12.") with Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d at
12 ("Five young citizens and two organizations, Kids vs. Global Warming and
Wildearth Guardians, bring this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for
Defendants' alleged failure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The Plaintiffs allege
that Defendants have violated their fiduciary duties to preserve and protect the
atmosphere as a commonly shared public trust resource under the public trust
doctrine.") (footnotes omitted).
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technically dictum.1 79 In the alternative, the Alec L. court concluded
that the PTD should be treated as state law in light of the doctrine's
historical development even if the PPL Montana decision was not
binding on lower courts.18 0
Furthermore, the Alec L. decision concluded that the Clean Air Act
had displaced the PTD relying upon the displacement analysis in the
AEP decision, which held that the Act displaced federal common law
public nuisance claims. 81 The court concluded that the AEP decision
had clearly intended to bar "any" federal common law claims and not
just public nuisance claims.1 82 Additionally, the Alec L. decision
interpreted the AEP decision as determining that federal judges may
not set limits on GHGs and COz when Congress has delegated those
policy decisions to a federal agency via statute.1 83 Thus, the district
court in Alec L. concluded that decisions regarding reductions in
GHGs and COz emissions "are determinations that are best left to the
federal agencies that are better equipped, and that have a
Congressional mandate, to serve as the 'primary regulator of
greenhouse gas emissions."'1 84 Accordingly, the Alec L. court found
that "even if Plaintiffs allege a public trust claim that could be
construed as sounding in federal common law, the court [found] that
85
that cause of action [was] displaced by the Clean Air Act."1
Similar to the Alec L. decision, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico
in Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez concluded that the
New Mexico Air Quality Control Act had incorporated and displaced
any public trust obligations by the State for the protection of New
Mexico's natural resources. Consequently, the Sanders-Reed court held
that the New Mexico law precluded a separate common law cause of
action under the state PTD.1 86 The state law provided for judicial
review of decisions of the New Mexico Environmental Improvement
Board, including those related to regulation of GHGs.18 7 Furthermore,
under separation-of-powers principles, the Court of Appeals of New
179 Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 15. The Alec L. decision did not address either
standing or the political question doctrine. See id. at 12-17.
1s0 See id. at 15.
181 Id. at 15-16 (discussing Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 425
(2011)).
183

Id. at 16.
Id. at 16-17.

184

Id. at 17 (quoting Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 428).

185

Id.

182

Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221, 1225-27 (N.M.
Ct. App. 2015).
186

187

Id. at 1226.
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Mexico concluded that administrative agencies were the proper
branch to decide policy questions relating to regulation of GHGs and
climate change rather than courts. 8 8 Moreover, the Court of Appeals
held that courts lacked the technical expertise possessed by
environmental agencies.1 89 Accordingly, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals affirmed a district court order granting the State's motion for
summary judgment against the plaintiffs' complaint seeking a
declaratory judgment that the common law PTD imposed a duty on
the State to regulate GHG emissions in New Mexico.1 90
In Juliana, Judge Aiken disagreed with the reasoning of the Alec L.
court that the PPL Montana's phrase treating the PTD as state law was
binding, because she reasoned that the Supreme Court's language was
merely dicta.1 91 She instead relied on two district court decisions from
the 1980s that had found that the federal government's acquisition of
submerged land beneath navigable rivers or tidelands was not
dependent on state law public trust obligations, but was instead
subject to federal public trust limitations.1 92 She distinguished the AEP
decision, which held that federal common law public nuisance claims
were displaced by the Clean Air Act, because unlike the nuisance
claims in AEP, the public trust claims "concern[ed] inherent attributes
of sovereignty" that could not be legislated away. Therefore, a
displacement analysis simply did not apply." 9 3 In her earlier
discussion of whether the plaintiffs' claims raised a nonjusticiable
political question, she had rejected the view that the dispute would
require a federal court to dictate to federal agencies how to reduce
GHG and CO 2 emissions.1 94

Although it was an unpublished per curiam memorandum decision,
it is notable that the D.C. Circuit's decision in Alec L. affirming the
district court's decision in the same case was written by three noted
appellate judges.1 95 The first member of the panel was Chief Judge
Merrick B. Garland, a distinguished jurist who was unsuccessfully
nominated by President Obama to serve as a Justice on the Supreme
See id. at 1227.
Id.
190 Id. at 1222, 1227.
191 SeeJuliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1258 (D. Or. 2016).
192 Id. at 1258-59 (first citing United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523
F. Supp. 120,
124 (D. Mass. 1981); and then citing City of Alameda v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 635 F.
Supp. 1447, 1450 (N.D. Cal. 1986)).
193 Id. at 1259-60.
194 Id. at 1239, 1260.
195 See Alex L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 Fed. App'x. 7, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
188
189
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Court.1 96 The second judge was Judge Sri Srinivasan, who was one of

three judges interviewed by President Obama for the Supreme Court
97
nomination that went to his colleague, Chief Judge Garland.1 The
third judge, Senior Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg, served as Chief Judge
of the D.C. Circuit from 2001 until 2008 and was a former Professor
98
Judge Ginsburg was
of Law at the Harvard Law School.1
unsuccessfully nominated by President Reagan in 1987 to serve as a
99
It is possible that these three
Justice on the Supreme Court.1
distinguished judges misinterpreted the PPL Montana decision as
Judge Aiken argued. 200 However, their differing interpretation of the
PPL Montana decision raises doubts whether the public trust portion
of the Julianadecision will be affirmed by the Ninth Circuit or by the
20
U.S. Supreme Court.
F.

Judge Aiken's Conclusions and the Future of the Case

The defendants argued that even if the PTD applies to the federal
government it is unenforceable either because no cause of action exists
or any action to enforce the doctrine is displaced by federal statutes
such as the Clean Air Act. 202 Judge Aiken's Juliana decision rejected
the defendants' non-enforcement arguments by "locat[ing] the source

196 Sarah Lyall, Liberals Are Still Angry, but Merrick Garland Has Reached
Acceptance, N.Y. TIMEs (Feb. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/19/us/
politics/merrick-garland-supreme-court-obama-nominee.html (discussing Chief Judge
Garland's unsuccessful nomination to the Supreme Court and his return to the D.C.
Circuit).
197 Karthick Ramakrishnan & Sono Shah, Three Reasons Why Nominating Sri Srinivasan
WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2016),
for the Supreme Court Could Change U.S. Elections, 20
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/ 16/03/14/three-reasons-thatnominating-sri-srinivasan-for-the-supreme-court-could-change-u-s-elections/ (arguing that
Judge Srinivasan should receive nomination to serve on Supreme Court).
198 Douglas H. Ginsburg, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR D.C. CIR., https://www.cadc.
uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsflContent/VL+-+Judges+-+DHG (last visited Nov. 1,
2018); see Steven V. Roberts, GinsburgWithdraws Name As Supreme Court Nominee,9 8Citing
Marijuana "Clamor," N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1 7/11/
08/us/ginsburg-withdraws-name-as-supreme-court-nominee-citing-marijuana-clamor.
html?pagewanted=all.

199 Roberts, supra note 198.

See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1258 (D. Or. 2016).
Compare id. at 1257-58 (arguing the Court's PPL Montana decision phrase
treating the PTD as state law was mere dictum), with Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v.
McCarthy, 561 F. App'x. 7, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (interpreting the PPL Montana's phrase
treating the PTD as state law as binding law that rejected any federal public trust
doctrine).
202 Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1259-60.
200
201
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of plaintiffs' public trust claims" and concluding that the "plaintiffs'
public trust rights both predated the Constitution and are secured by
it."203 She observed that the PTD "defines inherent aspects of
sovereignty" that predate the Constitution just as the founders of the
United States relied upon Social Contract theory for the propositions
that "people possess certain inalienable [r]ights and that governments
were established by consent of the governed for the purpose of
securing those rights." 204 Judge Aiken explained that "the Declaration
of Independence and the Constitution did not create the rights to life,
liberty, or the pursuit of happiness - the documents are, instead,
vehicles for protecting and promoting those already-existing rights." 205
Citing Illinois Central, she reasoned that that the PTD was similar to
"police power" in that state and federal governments "possess certain
powers that permit them to safeguard the rights of the people; . .
powers [that] are inherent in the authority to govern and cannot be
sold or bargained away." 20 6

However, even though the PTD predates the U.S. Constitution,
Judge Aiken determined that the enforcement of the doctrine was
based upon the Constitution's substantive due process rights. 207 She
relied upon one of Glucksberg's progeny cases for the proposition that
"the Due Process Clause's substantive component safeguards
fundamental rights that are 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'
or 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."'208 Judge
Aiken reasoned that the "Plaintiffs' public trust rights, related as they
are to inherent aspects of sovereignty and the consent of the governed
from which the United States' authority derives, satisfy both tests." 209
Because the public trust is not enumerated in the Constitution, she
saw the PTD as deriving from the Constitution's Ninth Amendment.210

Id. at 1260.
Id.
205 Id. at 1260-61.
206 See id. at 1261.
207 Id.
20s Id. (citing McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010) (citations,
quotations, and emphasis omitted)). The Supreme Court's McDonald opinion quoted
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) for the principle that fundamental
due process must be based on rights "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition." McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010).
209 Juliana,217 F. Supp. 3d at 1261.
210 Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
203

204
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However, Judge Aiken grounded the enforcement of the PTD directly
211
in the Due Process Clause of the Constitution's Fifth Amendment.
In Juliana, Judge Aiken concluded by acknowledging that the
defendants were "correct that plaintiffs likely could not obtain the
relief they seek through citizen suits brought under the Clean Air Act,
212
However, she
the Clean Water Act, or other environmental laws."

reasoned that existing limitations on statutory remedies did not apply
because the threat of "imminent" catastrophic climate change violated
213
the plaintiffs' fundamental due process rights to life and liberty.
Judge Aiken did not address why she presumed federal judges were
more competent than members of Congress or the President to
address climate change issues. 214 By contrast, relying in part on
Glucksberg's history and tradition standard, U.S. District Judge Nancy
G. Edmunds of the Eastern District of Michigan in her 2017 decision
for Lake v. City of Southgate215 concluded that there was no Supreme
Court or Sixth Circuit precedent establishing a fundamental liberty
interest and constitutional right to her health or freedom from bodily
harm from environmental harms, and, therefore, concluded that there
was no substantive due process right to health or freedom from bodily
harm as defined in Glucksberg.216 Judge Edmunds was aware of the
recent Juliana decision because she cited the case, but implicitly
disagreed with that decision by concluding that the City of Southgate

211 Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1261. A recent commentator has argued that courts
should recognize the public's interest in the PTD as a due process right under the U.S.
Constitution because it is a "protected property interest," fits within the police power,
and is consistent with precedent. O'Loughlin, supra note 158, at 1340-53. His
argument assumes the "PTD's longstanding tradition." Id. at 1339-41, 1344, 1351-53.
But Judge Aiken's approach of applying the PTD to climate change is arguably a
radical change. SeeJuliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1249-50 (implicitly acknowledging that
plaintiffs' due process claims were viable under Obergefell's new expansive reading of
the Due Process Clause, but not under the prior history and tradition standard of
interpretation).
212 Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1261.
213 See id. at 1261, 1267, 1272 (assuming that plaintiffs' allegations of imminent
harm are true at this stage of litigation).
214 See id. at 1249-50 (assuming judges have a right under the due process clause to
protect fundamental rights even if the legislature disagrees).
215 No. 16-10251, 2017 WL 767879 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 2017).
216 Id. at *3-4 & *4 n.4 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21
(1997)). Judge Aiken might distinguish public trust claims from a constitutional right
to health or freedom from bodily harm from environmental harms because of the long
history of PTD predating the U.S. Constitution. See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 126061. Part III of this Article will address why Glucksberg precludes climate change
challenges under a due process fundamental rights theory. See infra Part III.
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plaintiffs must rely upon statutory protections rather than new found
constitutional "rights."2

7
1

Judge Aiken rejected the defendants' argument that the case should be
dismissed because it was "unprecedented" and "groundbreaking. "218
Presumably, she would respond in the same way to Judge Edmunds'
City of Southgate decision rejecting a constitutional right to health or
freedom from bodily harm stemming from environmental harms
because it was unprecedented. 21 9 Judge Aiken opined in dicta that
"[f ]ederal courts too often have been cautious and overly deferential in
the arena of environmental law, and the world has suffered for it."220
Her Juliana decision concluded, "[e]ven when a case implicates hotly
contested political issues, the judiciary must not shrink from its role as a
coequal branch of government." 221

However, the Alec L. decision, the Alaska Supreme Court's Kanuk
decision, and the New Mexico Court of Appeals' decision in SandersReed ex rel. Sanders-Reed concluded that administrative agencies and
legislatures were better suited than the judiciary to addressing the
impacts of GHGs and CO2.222 Therefore, these cases call into question
the Juliana court's view that courts must solve the problems relating to
climate change. 223 Similarly, Judge Alsup dismissed a public nuisance
suit against major oil companies because he concluded that Congress
and the Executive Branch should decide climate change policy
questions instead of federal courts because of the significant foreign
affairs and international relations implications of energy policy. 224
Professors Blumm and Wood, who are strong supporters of PTD
suits challenging the federal government for failing to prevent climate
change, argue that Judge Aiken's Juliana decision will enable her to
put the federal government and the fossil fuel industry on trial for
causing "imminent" catastrophic climate change.225 Days before
President Obama left office, the federal defendants submitted an
answer to the complaint that admitted that fossil fuels contribute to
217
218

See City of Southgate, 2017 WL 767879 at *3-4 & *4 n.4.

Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1262.

City of Southgate, 2017 WL 767879 at *3-4.
Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1262.
221 Id. at 1263.
222 Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 16-17 (D.D.C. 2012); Kanuk
ex rel.
Kanuk v. State, Dep't of Nat. Res., 335 P.3d 1088, 1097-99 (Alaska 2014); SandersReed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221, 1226-27 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
223 See supra Parts 1.B & LE; infra Conclusion.
224 Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaints at 12, City of Oakland
vs. BP PLC, 2018 WL 3609055 No. C17-06011 WHA, (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2018).
225 Blumm & Wood, supra note 58, at 54-55.
219
220
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potentially dangerous CO2 emissions. 226 Professors Blumm and Wood
contend that these admissions will make it difficult for the Trump
Administration to contest the plaintiffs' climate change claims at
trial. 227 Accordingly, the Trump Administration may need to wait until
an appeal to the Ninth Circuit or to the U.S. Supreme Court to a panel
of appellate judges like in the Alec L. case, the Kanuk case, or the
Sanders-Reed case that are more skeptical of public trust climate
change challenges against the federal government or state
governments than Judge Aiken. 228
Trump Administration Seeks Mandamus and Stay in Ninth Circuit
After Judge Aiken published her Juliana decision, the Trump
Administration pursued lengthy and complicated litigation in the
Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court to dismiss the case, or at least to
stay the discovery and scheduled trial, but those efforts have so far
been unsuccessful. 229 The Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court appeared
to be reluctant to stop all discovery or prevent the trial altogether
before the plaintiffs can have an opportunity to present their case. 230
However, both the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court have separately
suggested, but not required, that the trial court narrow the scope of
the discovery and scheduled trial. 231
On June 9, 2017, one day after Judge Aiken denied the U.S.
2 32 the U.S.
Government's request for an interlocutory appeal,
Department of Justice ("DOJ") filed a Ninth Circuit Petition for a Writ
of Mandamus and a Request to Stay the proceedings in the Juliana case
on behalf of the U.S. Government. 233 The DOJ sought to dismiss the
case, and to stay the District Court's broad discovery orders that
G.

Id. at 58.
Id. Professors Blumm and Wood state, "The Trump Administration lawyers
could offer an amended answer disputing the climate science but, as Professor Michael
Burger has observed, 'The last thing a Trump Administration [D]epartment of
[Jiustice actually wants is to have the science of climate change go on trial."' Id. at 58
(quoting Megan Darby, Obama Ties Trump Admin into Accepting C02 Dangers,
CLIMATE CHANGE NEwS (Jan. 19, 2017, 4:04 PM), http://www.climatechangenews.com/
2017/01/19/obama-ties-trump-admin-into-accepting-co2-dangers).
228 See supra Parts I.B & LE; infra Conclusion.
229 See infra Part I.G.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Order Denying Interlocutory Appeal at 2, Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp.
3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC-AA).
233 Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 1-2, 43, Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp.
3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC-AA).
226
227
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require the Government to provide a wide range of documents
concerning government energy policy decisions for the past fifty
years. 234 In the Writ Petition, the DOJ brought similar challenges to
the suit as those unsuccessfully discussed above in Part I, except the
Writ did not address the political question doctrine. 235 The DOJ
argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing because their "alleged
injuries were widely shared by every member of Society." 236
Furthermore, the DOJ argued that the Juliana decision's expansive
interpretation of the PTD was wrong in light of the reasoning of the
Alec L. decision, which concluded that there was either no federal PTD
because the public trust doctrine is a state and not a federal doctrine,
or that the Clean Air Act displaced any federal trust obligations. 237
Additionally, the DOJ argued that there was no history, tradition or
precedent for a due process right to a stable climate system.

238

"No

court ha [d] ever recognized an implied Fifth Amendment cause of
action directly against the federal government itself that would allow
plaintiffs to seek, through injunctive and declaratory relief, a
fundamental re-ordering of national priorities to address an
environmental problem."239 Judge Aiken would likely acknowledge
that her due process analysis was unprecedented, but would reason
that a groundbreaking approach was needed to address what she saw
as the threat of "imminent" catastrophic climate change. 24 0 The DOJ
criticized the district court's constitutional rights approach to climate
change policies for usurping the authority of Congress, the President,
and federal agencies "to determine national policy regarding energy
development, use of public lands, and environmental protection." 241
Thus, the due process analysis in this case is interrelated to the
broader question addressed in Parts I and II of whether judges or the
political branches should make energy and environmental policy
choices. 242

Id. at 1.
Id. at 10-31; supra Parts I.C-E.
236 Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 233, at 10; see id. at 11-21 (arguing
plaintiffs failed to prove standing, injury, causation, and redressability).
237 Id. at 28-3 1.
238 Id. at 22-28
239 Id. at 27.
240 See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1233-34, 1250-52, 1261-63, 1267, 1272
(assuming that plaintiffs' allegations of imminent harm are true at this stage of
litigation).
241 Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 233, at 31-32.
242 See supra Parts LB, I.D & I.E; infra Part II.
234

235
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The Government argued that a writ of mandamus and stay was
necessary to prevent "onerous and disruptive" discovery seeking huge
numbers of documents compiled over decades, and to avoid an
infringement upon the President's confidential communications with
both federal agencies and foreign governments. 243 The DOJ relied on
Judge Aiken's own admission that the relief sought in the Julianacase
was "unprecedented" to argue that immediate appellate review was
essential. 244 Furthermore, the Government argued that a stay of
proceedings would not harm the plaintiffs because any further
emissions during the duration of the stay would be small compared to
"the cumulative effects of CO 2 emissions from every source in the
world over decades." 245
After the Government filed its petition for a writ of mandamus and
stay in the Ninth Circuit, there were some developments in the case.
On June 28, 2017, Magistrate Judge Coffin allowed the industry
246
intervenors to withdraw from the case over the plaintiffs' objections.
247
which was
Additionally, he scheduled a February 2018 trial date,
subsequently postponed until October 2018.248 On July 25, 2017, a
three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit issued a temporary stay
order. 249 The Ninth Circuit's July 25th order also announced, "[tihe
petition for a writ of mandamus and all other pending motions will be
addressed by separate order." 250
On December 11, 2017, the Ninth Circuit held oral argument on
251
whether to stay the case and the trial date set by Judge Coffin. The
three-judge panel hearing the case consisted of Chief Judge Sidney
243 Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 233, at 32-37, 39.
244 Id. at 37-38.

Id. at 39.
9th Circuit Temporarily Pauses Youth Climate Trust Suit, INSIDEEPA.coM (July 26,
2017), https://insideepa.com/daily-feed/9th-circuit-temporarily-pauses-youth-climate-trustsuit.
247 Id.
248 Court Slates October Trial Date for Youth Climate Suit, INSIDEEPA.coM (Apr. 13,
2018), https://insideepa.com/daily-feed/court-slates-october-trial-date-youth-climate-suit;
Kartikay Mehrotra, Justice Department Says Trump Should Be Immune from Teens' Climate
Lawsuit, BLOOMBERG (May 10, 2018, 1:32 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2018-05-10/u-s-says-suing-teens-can-t-force-trump-to-fix-climate-change.
249 "The Court stays district court proceedings, temporarily, pending further order
from this court." Temporary Stay Order at 1, United States v. U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Oregon, No. 17-71692 (D. Or. July 25, 2017).
250 Id.
251 Abby Smith, Kids' Lawsuit over Climate Change Faces Big Test in Federal Court,
(Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.bna.com/kids-lawsuit-climateBLOOMBERG BNA
n73014472918/.
245

246

892

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 52:855

Thomas, an appointee of President Clinton; Judge Marsha Berzon, also
appointed by President Clinton; and Judge Alex Kozinski, an
appointee of President Reagan. 252 Commentators interpreted the tenor
of questions during the oral argument to suggest that Judges Berzon
and Thomas would reject the DOJ's request to dismiss the case,
although they might vote to narrow the scope of the case. 253 By
contrast, Judge Kozinski's questions appeared more sympathetic to the
DOJ's position on the ultimate resolution of the case against the
plaintiffs, but it was not clear that he is willing to grant the mandamus
petition because it is an extraordinary remedy.2 54 On December 18,
2017, Judge Kozinski announced his immediate retirement in the
wake of alleged sexual misconduct. 255

252

Id.

253 See Joyce E. Cutler, Appeals Judges Hear Effort to Knock out Children's Climate
Lawsuit, BLOOMBERG ENV'T (Dec. 11, 2017, 3:28 PM), https://bnanews.bna.com/

environment-and-energy/appeals-judges-hear-effort-to-knock-out-childrens-climatelawsuit (suggesting that Chief Judge Thomas and Judge Berzon are likely to deny the
U.S. Government's mandamus motion to block the Juliana trial); Dawn Reeves, 9th
Circuit Judges Appear Likely to Let Novel Youth Climate Case Proceed, INSIDEEPA.coM
(Dec. 11, 2017), https://insideepa.com/daily-news/9th-circuit-judges-appear-likely-letnovel-youth-climate-case-proceed [hereinafter 9th Circuit Judges] (suggesting that
Chief Judge Thomas and Judge Berzon might narrow the scope of the Juliana case, but
are unlikely to stop the trial); Abby Smith, Judge from Kids' Climate Suit Retires amid
Harassment Claims,
BLOOMBERG
ENV'T
(Dec.
22,
2017),
https://news.
bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/judge-from-kids-climate-suitretires-amid-harassment-claims?context=article-related
[hereinafter Judge from Kids'
Climate Suit] (suggesting that Chief Judge Thomas and Judge Berzon are likely to rule
in favor of the plaintiffs).
254 See Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980) (per curiam)
("[Tihe remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordinary
situations."); R. Henry Weaver & Douglas A. Kysar, Courting Disaster: Climate Change
and the Adjudication of Catastrophe, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 295, 348 (2017)
(observing that U.S. Government faces an uphill battle in winning mandamus petition
from the Ninth Circuit in the Juliana case because such writs are difficult to obtain,
but acknowledging the possibility that the court of appeals could grant the request);
Reeves, 9th Circuit Judges, supra note 253 (suggesting Judge Kozinski would
ultimately deny the U.S. Government's mandamus request because it is an
extraordinary remedy); see also Smith, Judge from Kids' Climate Suit, supra note 253
(suggesting that Judge Kozinski was skeptical of plaintiffs' claims, but reporting that
Professor Michael Gerrard was uncertain whether Kozinski would have voted for the
plaintiffs or Government).
255 See Debra Cassens Weiss, Kozinski Announces His Immediate Retirement
After
More Women Accuse Him of Sexual Misconduct, ABA J. (Dec. 18, 2017, 10:19 AM),
http://www.abajournal.connews/article/kozinski announces-his-immediate-retireme
ntafter morewomen accusehim of. Chief Justice Roberts referred Chief Judge
Thomas's complaint regarding those charges to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
for review and disposition. Id. In February 2018, the Second Circuit's judicial council
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On March 7, 2018, the Ninth Circuit denied the U.S. Government's
256
The Ninth
Petition for a Writ of Mandamus without prejudice.
Circuit concluded that the U.S. Government's petition was premature,
that the Government had failed to demonstrate the "extraordinary
circumstances" required for mandamus relief when a party asks an
appellate court to review a case before the trial court proceedings have
concluded, and that the District Court could remedy the
Government's concerns about overly broad discovery requests by the
plaintiffs.257 Accordingly, the district court could proceed to hold a
trial on the plaintiffs' claims, but the Ninth Circuit perhaps suggested
that the district court should consider narrowing the claims before
it.258 As Chief Judge Thomas noted, the court was "mindful that some
of the plaintiffs' claims as currently pleaded [were] quite broad, and
some of the remedies the plaintiffs seek may not be available as
redress." 259 The Ninth Circuit further observed, "[c1laims and
remedies often are vastly narrowed as litigation proceeds; we have no
260
reason to assume this case will be any different."
In May 2018, the DOJ filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
with Magistrate Judge Coffin arguing that President Trump was
immune from suit in the Juliana case because the Constitution's
separation of powers doctrine prohibited federal courts from forcing
the president into taking action on any policy issue, including climate
change. 261 Specifically, the DOJ contended that long standing
precedent forbade federal courts from issuing an injunction against the
President

of

the

United

States

for

official

acts. 262 The

federal

government's motion sought to block a scheduled October 2018 trial

dismissed the grievance because Kozinski had retired. Joan Biskupic, Judicial Council
Takes No Action Against FormerJudge Alex Kozinski, CNN POL. (Feb. 5, 2018, 6:44
PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/05/politics/alex-kozinski-sexual-misconduct-casedropped/index.html.
256 In re United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Or., 884 F.3d 830, 838 (9th Cir.
2018). Following the retirement of Judge Kozinski, Judge Friedland was randomly drawn
to replace him on the panel. Abby Smith & Kartikay Mehrotra, Youths Defeat Trump's Move
PM),
2018, 3:45
(Mar. 7,
to Kill Climate Lawsuit, BLOOMBERG ENv'T
https://bnanews.bna.com/environment-and-energy/youthsdefeattrumpsmove-to-killclimate-lawsuit-1.
257 In re United States, 884 F.3d at 838; Smith & Mehrotra, supra note 256.
258 See In re United States, 884 F.3d at 838; Smith & Mehrotra, supra note 256.
259 In re United States, 884 F.3d at 837; see Smith & Mehrotra, supra note 256.
260 In re United States, 884 F.3d at 838.
261 Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 7-10, Juliana v. United
States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. May 9, 2018) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC).
262

Id. at 7-8.
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in Oregon on the merits of the plaintiffs climate change claims. 263
Additionally, the DOJ filed a separate motion for a Protective Order
and for a Stay of All Discovery arguing that the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA")264 and constitutional separation of power
principles barred all discovery because federal courts are limited to
reviewing the record of the applicable agencies rather than creating a
new record through discovery requests. 265
On May 25, 2018, Magistrate Judge Coffin denied the defendants'
motion for a protective order and for a stay of discovery because the
court concluded that the Government's claim that the case should be
reviewed under the APA was false because "the plaintiffs' complaint
[did] not contain an APA claim," and "the defendants [had] no ability
to edit the complaint to cobble the claim into one of their choosing to
derail discovery."266 He suggested that the DOJ's motion for a
protective order and for a stay of discovery was essentially an attempt
to re-litigate the Government's failed effort to dismiss the case before
Judge Aiken and then the Ninth Circuit. 267 Finally, Judge Coffin
determined that the Government's separation of powers arguments for
denying all discovery were "based on wholly hypothetical scenarios
that may implicate matters of privilege during the discovery
process." 268 Instead, the DOJ should have sought a protective order
when the plaintiffs sought specific information that the Government
asserted is privileged.269
On July 17, 2018, the Department of Justice filed a motion in the
U.S. Supreme Court seeking to stay discovery and halt the trial in the
Juliana case. 270 In an order dated July 30, 2018, the Supreme Court
See id. at 5.
See 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq. (2018).
265 See Defendants' Motion for a Protective Order and for a Stay of All Discovery at
8-20, Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. May 9, 2018) (No. 6:15cv-01517-TC); DOJ Seeks to Avoid Discovery in Youth Climate Case, INSIDEEPA.coM
(May 14, 2018), https://insideepa.com/daily-feed/doj-seeks-avoid-discovery-youthclimate-case.
266 Order Denying Defendants' Motions for a Protective Order
and Stay at 1-2,
Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. May 25, 2018) (No. 6:15-cv01517-TC).
267 Id. at 2.
268 Id. at 2-3.
269 Id. at 3.
270 Notice of Filing of Application to the Supreme Court for Stay at 10, Juliana v. United
States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. July 17, 2018) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC); Dawn
Reeves, Trump Administration Asks Supreme Court To Stay Youth Climate Case,
INSIDEEPA.cOM (July 19, 2018), https://insideepa.com/daily-news/trump-administrationasks-supreme-court-stay-youth-climate-case.
263

264
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denied the Government's motion without prejudice. 271 Nevertheless,
the Court warned the District Court:
The breadth of respondents' claims is striking, however, and
the justiciability of those claims presents substantial grounds
for difference of opinion. The District Court should take these
concerns into account in assessing the burdens of discovery
and trial, as well as the desirability of a prompt ruling on the
272
Government's pending dispositive motions.
In light of the Supreme Court's order, lawyer Philip Gregory of the
Gregory Law Group, who is serving as co-counsel for the youth
plaintiffs in the Juliana case, thanked the Court for allowing the case
to go forward, but also acknowledged that the District Court would
need to "promptly address narrowing the claims so that the trial can
273
go forward" as scheduled on October 29, 2018 in Eugene, Oregon.
II.

A

CRITIQUE OF OBERGEFELL'S DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS

Part II will criticize the due process analysis in Justice Kennedy's
Obergefell decision. 274 Accordingly, this article will challenge Judge
Aiken's approach to due process in Juliana because it relied heavily
upon his Obergefell decision. 275 Justice Kennedy's theory of judges
using their "reasoned judgment" to create an evolving number of
27 7
fundamental due process rightS 276 is profoundly anti-democratic.

Judge Sutton has argued that "[a] principled jurisprudence
constitutional evolution turns on evolution in society's values,
evolution in judges' values." 278 He explained, "[tlhe theory of
living constitution rests on the premise that every generation has

of
not
the
the

271 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, No. 18A65, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 4112 (July 30,
2018).
272

Id.

273 Supreme Court Rejects DOJ Bid to Halt Youths' Climate Case, INSIDEEPA.coM (July
30, 2018), https://insideepa.com/daily-feed/supreme-court-rejects-doj-bid-halt-youthsclimate-case.
274 See infra Part II.
275

See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1249-50 (implicitly acknowledging that

plaintiffs' due process claims were viable under Obergefell's new expansive reading of
the Due Process Clause, but not under the prior history and tradition standard of

interpretation); infra Part 11.
276 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
277 See generally Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611-12, 2616-23 (Roberts, CJ.,
dissenting).
278 DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 416 (6th Cir. 2014), overruled by Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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right to govern itself. If that premise prevents judges from insisting on
principles that society has moved past, so too should it prevent judges
from anticipating principles that society has yet to embrace." 279 Like
Chief Justice Robert's dissenting opinion in Obergefell,280 Judge
Sutton's opinion in DeBoer v. Snyder281 argued that courts should defer
to state legislatures in deciding whether to accept same sex marriage.
His opinion was overruled by Obergefell.282
Judge Sutton warned that the judicial creation of a constitutional
right to same sex marriage would open the door to other groups
demanding constitutional rights in other areas. He reasoned that
"[t]he more the Court innovates under the Constitution, the more
plausible it is for the Court to do still more - and the more plausible
it is for other advocates on behalf of other issues to ask the Court to
innovate still more." 283 Judge Sutton cautioned that the expansion of
constitutional rights would make judges more like legislators and, as a
result, intensify battles over the confirmation of judges. 284 Judge
Aiken's use of Obergefell's expansive "reasoned judgment" model 285 of
establishing fundamental constitutional rights shows that Judge Sutton
was right that a decision establishing a constitutional right to same sex
marriage would lead advocates to seek the expansion of constitutional
rights in other areas. 286
However, a decision establishing a constitutional right to same sex
marriage through a rational basis test under the Equal Protection
Clause would have posed less dangers of future judicial law-making
than Justice Kennedy's "reasoned judgment" due process analysis. 287
Judge Posner, in his Seventh Circuit decision of Baskin v. Bogan,
invalidated two state statutes defining marriage as exclusively
heterosexual by using a rational basis analysis under the Equal
Protection Clause while deliberately avoiding the issue of whether
such marriages are a fundamental right under the Due Process

Id.
See generally Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611-12, 2616-23
dissenting).
281 See DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 416-18.
279
280

282

Id.

283

Id. at 418.

284

Id.

(Roberts, CJ.,

See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1249-50 (D. Or. 2016)
(quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598 (majority opinion)).
286 DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 418.
287 See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1249-50 (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015)).
285
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Clause. 288 Judge Posner concluded that there was no rational or
reasonable basis for Indiana and Wisconsin to forbid same-sex
marriage based upon tradition, when there was no proof that allowing
same-sex marriage would change the marriage decisions of
heterosexual persons. 289 Because he concluded that discrimination
against same sex marriage was irrational and invalid under the Equal
Protection Clause, Judge Posner determined that he could avoid the
issue of whether same-sex marriage is a fundamental right under the
Due Process Clause. 290
Judge Aiken in Juliana implicitly acknowledged that she could not
have used a rational basis analysis under the Equal Protection Clause
291
to establish a new constitutional right to a stable climate system.
She conceded that present environmental and energy statutes and
regulations regulating climate change are rational and only fail if they
are subjected to strict scrutiny under Justice Kennedy's evolving due
process approach in Obergefell.292 Judge Aiken accepted that it was
clear and undisputed that the government's actions approving various
types of fossil fuel extraction and burning would pass rational basis
review. 293 Accordingly, it would have been impossible for Judge Aiken
in Juliana to apply a rational basis analysis under the Equal Protection
Clause to establish a new constitutional right to a stable climate
system.294

288 See, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 654-57, 671-72 (7th Cir. 2014);
Lamparello, supra note 10, at 59-60; see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584,
2623 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguingJustice Kennedy's majority opinion in
Obergefell failed to use the modern Equal Protection Clause's means-end methodology
in favor of a vague argument that there is "synergy" between that Clause and the Due
Process Clause).
289 See Baskin, 766 F.3d at 654-72. Judge Sutton in DeBoer disagreed that rational
basis analysis under the Equal Protection Clause necessitated the invalidation of bans
on same-sex marriage because he reasoned that a state could distinguish between
heterosexual couples who are potentially capable of sexual procreation from same sex
couples who need assisted reproduction to have children, and because he gave more
deference to the traditional definition of marriage as being heterosexual in nature,
although he acknowledged societal costs to same sex couples and their children. Cf.
DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 404-08. Whether Judge Posner or Judge Sutton was correct in
reaching different conclusions about whether bans on same-sex marriage are valid
under rational basis review is beyond the scope of this article.
290 Baskin, 766 F.3d at 656-57.
291 See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1249-50 (discussing Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at
2598).
292 Id. at 1248-50.
293 Id. at 1248-49.
294 See id. at 1249-50.
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Another possible way to cabin the Obergefell decision is Professor
Kenji Yoshino's argument that Justice Kennedy's evolving conception
of due process should be interpreted as a vision of liberty that he calls
"antisubordination liberty" that protects "historically subordinated
groups." 295 While racism or sexism may in some cases exacerbate the
impacts of climate change, 296 the phenomenon of climate change
generally affects the entire U.S. population. 297 Poor people may be
affected more than others depending upon their location and their
means to adapt to climate change. 298 By contrast, gay individuals were
subject to directed prejudice by both public officials and some of their
fellow citizens in the enforcement of antisodomy laws that much more
easily qualifies as illegal
discrimination
under Yoshino's
"antisubordination liberty" interpretation of fundamental rights under
the Due Process Clause. 299 Under both the Equal Protection Clause
and Professor Yoshino's "antisubordination liberty" due process
analysis, courts should defer to the political branches in addressing the
impacts of climate change on the poor and minority groups unless
clear examples of intentional bias can be proven.300
III.

ALTERNATIVES TO ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE WITHOUT
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION

Some commentators believe that the Earth is approaching an
"imminent" catastrophic tipping point where it will impossible to stop
a runaway train of climate disaster.301 They conclude that immediate
295 Yoshino, supra note 20, at 174.
296 See, e.g., Cooney, supra note 22 (contending climate change disproportionately
affects women); Rodriguez, supra note 22 (arguing President Trump's withdrawal
from the Paris Climate Accord will "especially [harm] people of color, who often
unfairly bear the brunt of climate change's effects").
297 Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 10, Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d
1224 (D. Or. 2016) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC-AA) (arguing impacts of climate change
"are widely shared by every member of Society").
298 See generally Goldenberg, supra note 23.
299 See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 416 (6th Cir. 2014), overruled by
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Yoshino, supra note 20, at 174.
300 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (holding Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act does not include private right of action based upon disparate impact,
and, therefore, requiring plaintiffs to prove government officials committed
intentional acts of racial or other prohibited discrimination).
301 See Blumm & Wood, supra note 58, at 39-41, 87; Weaver &
Kysar, supra note 254,
at 296-97, 304-12, 355-56; see also Ashley Strickland, Earth to Warm 2 Degrees Celsius by
the End of This Century, Studies Say, CNN (July 31, 2017, 9:37 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/31/health/climate-change-two-degrees-studies/index.html
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judicial intervention is essential because the U.S. political system will
not respond in time. 302 Accordingly, they applaud Judge Aiken's
Juliana decision. 303 However, commentators also recognize that the
Juliana decision is a preliminary decision that is a prelude to a lengthy
trial on the merits, and that her decision will eventually be scrutinized
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and probably by the U.S.
304
Supreme Court.

Not all commentators would agree that climate change likely poses
"imminent" catastrophic consequences because human society is
already adapting to changes and because new technologies can limit
305
the total amount of possible global warming caused by fossil fuels.

New research by scientists, led by Richard Millar of the University of
Oxford, concludes that human beings have approximately twenty
years until 2038 to limit global warming to a total increase of 1.5
degrees Celsius, which would avoid further worsening the
consequences of climate change. 306 If the Earth is not facing an
"imminent" climate change catastrophe, there is a strong argument for
allowing Congress and the President to resolve the issue rather than
("By the end of the century, the global temperature is likely to rise more than 2 degrees
Celsius, or 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit. This rise in temperature is the ominous conclusion
reached by two different studies using entirely different methods published in the journal
Nature Climate Change on [July 31, 20171 . . . "); David Wallace-Wells, The Uninhabitable
Earth, NYMAG.coM: DAILY INTELLIGENCER (July 9, 2017), http://nymag.com/daily/
intelligencer/2017/07/climate-change-earth-too-hot-for-humans.html (arguing catastrophic
climate change has already begun to affect the Earth and will worsen).
302 Blumm & Wood, supra note 58, at 87; Weaver & Kysar, supra note 254, at 296-

-

97, 304-12, 354-56.
303 Blumm & Wood, supra note 58, at 84-87; Weaver & Kysar, supra note 254, at 356.
304 Blumm & Wood, supra note 58, at 62; Weaver & Kysar, supranote 254, at 348.
305 See Oren Cass, Truth Is Just a Detail, CITYJ. (July 11, 2017), https://www.cityjournal.org/html/truth-just-detail-15316.html (criticizing New York Magazine article
predicting catastrophic climate change because it "ignores humanity's capacity for
adapting to changes that will occur slowly over decades or centuries"); Andrew
Freedman, No, New York Mag: Climate Change Won't Make The Earth Uninhabitableby
2100, MASHABLE (July 10, 2017), http://mashable.com/2017/07/10/new-york-mag2
climate-story-inaccurate-doomsday-scenario/#u 0odZ1QXPqI (criticizing New York
Magazine article predicting catastrophic climate change and reporting "climate
scientists nearly universally say that there is still time to avert the worst consequences
of global warming").
306 Chris Mooney, New Climate Change CalculationsCould Buy the Earth Some Time
If They're Right, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
2
news/energy-environment/wp/ 017/09/18/new-climate-calculations-could-buy-the-earthsome-time-if-theyre-rightlnutm term=.ce38c6bb48ff (Millar's study "finds that we have
more than 700 billion tons [of carbon dioxide] left to emit to keep warming within 1.5
degrees Celsius, with a two-thirds probability of success. 'That's about 20 years [from
20171 at present-day emissions."').
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'

through unprecedented judicial intervention in energy policy issues
that is contrary to fundamental separation of powers principles in the
U.S. Constitution. 307
According to Bloomberg New Energy Finance ("BNEF"), rapid
technological developments in solar power, wind power and battery
storage will force coal and even natural gas fossil fuel power plants out
of business faster than previously forecast.308 As a result of the growth
of cheaper renewable energy, the amount of energy from coal burning
plants in the U.S. will be roughly half of what it is in 2017 by 2040,
despite President Trump's efforts to promote fossil fuels. 309 In Europe,
coal power capacity will fall by eighty-seven percent in the same time
period. 3 10 By 2021, solar power should cost roughly the same as new
coal power plants in developing countries such as China and India.31
In 2016, China installed so many solar panels that it made up close to
half of the global market, and the International Energy Agency
estimates that 1000 gigawatts of renewables will be installed in the five
years from 2018 through 2022.312 While President Trump's policies
favoring fossil fuels will have some impact on energy outcomes, 313 the
surge of cheaper renewable energy and rising investments in
renewables suggest that CO 2 emissions from fossil fuels may decline
after 2026, which is a sharp contrast with previous forecasts that
predicted rising emissions for decades to come. 3 14 Judge Aiken refused
to dismiss theJulianacase because she found the plaintiffs' predictions
of "imminent" catastrophic climate change plausible at that stage of
litigation.3 15 However, their claims may be based on out dated CO 2
emissions predictions. 3 16
307 See generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535-36 (2007) (Roberts,
CJ.,
dissenting) (arguing that climate change is a global political problem that should be
decided by the political branches, and, therefore, is a nonjusticiable general grievance
unsuitable for resolution by the federal courts).
308 Shankleman & Warren, supra note 29.
309 Id.
310

Id.

311

Id.

312 Anna Hirtenstein, Renewable Energy: Dawn of Solar Age Declared as Sun Power
Beats All Others, BLOOMBERG ENV'T (Oct. 4, 2017, 5:49 AM), https://bnanews.bna.com/
environment-and-energy/dawn-of-solar-age-declared-as-sun-power-beats-all-others.
313 See Salena Zito, Don't Be So Quick to Dismiss Trump's Coal Mining Initiative, N.Y.
POST (June 17, 2017, 7:31 PM), http://nypost.com/2017/06/17/dont-be-so-quick-todismiss-trumps-coal-mining-initiative/ (arguing President Trump's favorable policies
have helped to revive coal mining industry).
314 Shankleman & Warren, supra note 29.
315 Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1244, 1250-52, 1261, 1272 (D.
Or. 2016) (assuming that plaintiffs' allegations of imminent harm are true at this stage
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While climate change is an important and concerning issue, federal
courts should follow Glucksberg's history and tradition standard for
3 17
deciding which challenges are pursuant to the Due Process Clause.
As Judge Aiken implicitly acknowledged, newly articulated claims to
right to a stable climate system could only qualify under Obergefell's
evolving due process analysis and not under Glucksberg's history and
tradition standard. 318 Courts should apply a rational basis review
standard, and, as Judge Aiken conceded, federal environmental and
energy laws and policies are rational and not a violation of due process
rights as they are defined in Glucksberg.319
The Alec L. decision made a strong argument that the PTD has been
defined by state decisions, and that it is not clear that a separate
federal PTD exists. 320 Furthermore, the Alec L. decision reasoned that
any possible federal PTD regarding climate change is displaced by the
Clean Air Act in the same manner as the analysis in AEP.321 Judge
Aiken made a plausible counter-argument that the PTD defines the
rights of the federal government and not just state governments
322
because it predates and informs the meaning of the Constitution.
But even if the Clean Air Act does not completely displace all possible
federal PTD claims, courts should look to the history of how the PTD
has been applied by American courts to determine the scope of the
PTD under either state or federal law. Pursuant to Glucksberg's history
and tradition standard for determining which challenges are
323 the public
fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause,
interest in submerged lands in Illinois Central might possibly qualify as
324
a fundamental right or at least raise serious constitutional questions.
of litigation).
316 See Shankleman & Warren, supranote 29.
(stating that
317 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997)
fundamental due process rights should be recognized only if they are based on rights
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition").
31
See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1249-50.
319 Id. at 1248-49.
320 Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 15-16 (D.D.C. 2012) (discussing Am.
Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011)).
321 Id. at 15-16.
322 See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1255-61.
323 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (concluding that
fundamental due process rights should be limited to rights "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition").
324 See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452-54 (1892) (holding State of
Illinois could not alienate submerged lands under Chicago harbor to a private
corporation); Order and Findings and Recommendation at 23, Juliana v. United
States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. Apr. 8, 2016) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC)
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Creating a new constitutional right to climate stability is different from
recognizing that the PTD has traditionally limited the right of
governments to alienate title or control of submerged lands under tidal
or navigable waters that was the central holding of the Supreme
Court's Illinois Central decision.325 Accordingly, the Alec L. decision
correctly determined that the EPA's interpretation of the Clean Air Act
should decide climate change policy questions, and not judges
applying the PTD to novel questions of climate change. 326
Accordingly, both Judge Aiken's substantive due process analysis and
her understanding of the PTD are flawed because they depart too
greatly from the history and traditions of the Clause and the PTD. 327
CONCLUSION

The Alec L. decision in the District Court of the District of
Columbia, Judge Alsup's City of Oakland decision, the Alaska Supreme
Court's Kanuk decision, and the New Mexico Court of Appeals'
decision in Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed, all offer a more
appropriate delineation between the roles of the judiciary and the
political branches in addressing the problems relating to climate
change than the Julianadecision. 32 8 Furthermore, the Alec L. decision,
the Kanuk decision, and the Sanders-Reed decision each aptly
recognized that administrative agencies have more expertise than
courts in addressing environmental challenges, including climate
change.329 The separation of powers principles in the U.S. Constitution
and state constitutions give executive agencies the authority to enforce
environmental laws and remedies rather than courts. 330 Instead of
(questioning in the hypothetical whether the federal government could alienate the
territorial waters off the West Coast to a private corporation).
325 Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 452-54.
326 Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 15-16 (D.D.C. 2012).
327 See supra Parts I.D, II.
328 See generally Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 15-16 (deferring to the political
branches on policy question of addressing climate change and regulation of
greenhouse gases); Kanuk ex rel. Kanuk v. State, Dep't of Nat. Res., 335 P.3d 1088,
1097-1103 (Alaska 2014) (same); Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350
P.3d 1221, 1226-27 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015) (same); Order Granting Motions to Dismiss
Amended Complaints at 10-16, City of Oakland vs. BP P.L.C. (N.D. Cal. June 28,
2018) (No. 3:17-cv-06011-WHA & No. 3:17-cv-06012-WHA) (same); supra Parts I.B,
I.E (discussing the argument that the political branches are better equipped to address
policy questions of climate change and regulation of greenhouse gases).
329 Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 15-16; Kanuk, 335 P.3d at 1097-1103;
Sanders-Reed,
350 P.3d at 1226-27.
330 Sanders-Reed, 350 P.3d at 1226-27; see Kanuk, 335 P.3d at 1097-1103 (citing
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usurping executive power under the guise of substantive due process,
courts should limit their role in environmental and energy cases to
reviewing the administrative actions of executive agencies to
3
determine their compliance with the law.3 1

Despite Judge Aiken's attempt to distinguish between common law
tort and common law PTD claims, 332 the Alec L. decision provides
strong reasoning that the Clean Air Act has displaced any claims
regarding climate change under a possible federal PTD in a similar
way as the Supreme Court had determined that the Act displaced
federal common law public nuisance claims against large GHG and
CO 2 emitters in AEP.333 The district court in the Alec L. decision

rightly concluded that decisions regarding reductions in GHGs and
CO 2 emissions "are determinations that are best left to the federal
agencies that are better equipped, and that have a Congressional
mandate, to serve as the 'primary regulator of greenhouse gas
emissions."' 33 4 Accordingly, the Alec L. decision appropriately
determined that any possible federal PTD claims regarding climate

335
The problems of climate
change are displaced by the Clean Air Act.

change are primarily the responsibility of the political branches, and
the ancient PTD cannot be reworked to justify judicial supremacy
even if one does not agree with the environmental policies of the
current President or Congress.336

prudential grounds for dismissing public trust suit where political branches are better
capable than courts in deciding environmental policy questions).
331 Sanders-Reed, 350 P.3d at 1226-27; see Kanuk, 335 P.3d at 1097-1103.
332 See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1259-60 (D. Or. 2016).
333 Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 15-16 (discussing Am. Elec. Power Co. v.
Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 426-428 (2011)).
334 Id. at 17 (quoting Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 428
(2011)).
335 Id.
336 Professor Kysar and two co-authors in two different articles have argued that
climate change suits could serve as prods or pleas to encourage the political branches
to consider climate change legislation rather than as a judicial fiat ordering them to do
so. See Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in
an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 350, 355-57, 359-67, 423-24 (2011);
Weaver & Kysar, supra note 254, at 342-56. However, Judge Aiken's use of
substantive due process to deny the U.S. Government's motion to dismiss threatens to
serve as the type of anti-democratic judicial fiat that Judge Sutton warned against in
DeBoer v. Snyder, because using a substantive due process analysis to strike down a
statute has profoundly anti-democratic impacts. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 41618 (6th Cir. 2014), overruled by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 5. Ct. 2584 (2015); Slugh,
supra note 13 (criticizing the Juliana decision for using Obergefell's substantive due
process approach to create a new constitutional due process right to a stable climate).

